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“Bodies were falling all around us . . . . The girls just leaped
wildly out of the windows and turned over and over before reach-
ing the sidewalk . . . . They stood on the windowsills tearing their
hair out in the handfuls and then they jumped. One girl held back
after all the rest and clung to the window casing until the flames
from the window below crept up to her and set her clothing on fire.
Then she jumped far over the net and was killed instantly, like all
the rest.”
–Benjamin Levy, eyewitness to the
Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire1
* Associate Professor, St. Louis University School of Law. Thanks to the St.
Louis University School of Law Summer Research Stipend Program, which supported
the research and writing of this article. This article benefited from the insight and
advice of John O’Connell, participants in the St. Louis University School of Law
faculty workshop, and the excellent editors at the New York University Journal of
Legislation and Public Policy. Great thanks to Hayley Collins and Jesse Packard for
their excellent research assistance. Any errors or omissions are mine alone.
1. Stories of Survivors, and Witnesses and Rescuers Outside Tell What They Saw,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 4 [hereinafter Stories of Survivors].
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INTRODUCTION
Just a few minutes before closing time on Saturday, March 25,
1911, a fire broke out on the factory floor at the Triangle Shirtwaist
Factory, which operated on the top three floors of a modern “fire-
proof” building in New York City. Within half an hour, it was all
over. One hundred forty-six of the five hundred employees had died.
They had suffocated, burned to death, jumped, or fallen from the
building. Those who died had been unable to escape for a number of
reasons: there were not enough exits, the exit doors opened into the
room, making them difficult to open against the crush of people trying
to leave, some doors were locked, there was no adequate fire escape,
the layout of the sewing machines blocked workers’ paths to the
doors, and piles of waste material, much of it soaked with machine oil
from the sewing machines, allowing the fire to spread even quicker.2
The vast majority of those killed in the fire were girls and young
women between sixteen and twenty-three years old.3 Most were recent
immigrants who could barely speak English, and almost all were the
main source of financial support for their families.4 According to one
contemporary account:
The victims–mostly Italians, Russians, Hungarians, and
Germans–were girls and men who had been employed . . . after the
strike in which the Jewish girls, formerly employed, had become
unionized and had demanded better working conditions. The build-
ing had experienced four recent fires and had been reported by the
Fire Department to the Building Department as unsafe on account
of the insufficiency of the exits.5
The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory tragedy mobilized the labor
movement and progressive reformers, and provided part of the politi-
cal will to enact significant protective health and safety legislation for
workers.6 And while the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire has been
2. 141 Men and Girls Die in Waist Factory Fire; Trapped High Up in Washington
Place Building; Street Strewn with Bodies; Piles of Dead Inside, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 1911, at 1 [hereinafter 141 Men and Girls Die] (describing the scraps and “sewing
machines placed so closely together that there was barely aisle room for the girls




6. See ELIZABETH FAULKNER BAKER, PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION, WITH SPE-
CIAL REFERENCE TO WOMEN IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 153–56 (1925). There is
debate over whether the fire was used as a symbol by reformers already agitating for
protective legislation, Eric G. Behrens, The Triangle Shirtwaist Company Fire of
1911: A Lesson in Legislative Manipulation, 62 TEX. L. REV. 361, 365–67 (1983), or
whether the fire caused the legislative effort, Arthur F. McEvoy, The Triangle Shirt-
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cited in legal literature as an important event in the movement for
workplace safety standards, however, the gendered nature of the trag-
edy and its place in the development of laws protecting women as
women, rather than as beneficiaries of laws protecting all workers, has
not been as fully explored. This contribution seeks to do that.
Part I of this article will situate the fire and the subsequent re-
forms in the social movements of the time, at the intersection of the
labor movement and other progressive causes championed by women.
It will also describe why the success of early protective labor legisla-
tion depended, in part, on gender. Part II will describe the shift in law
from protecting women workers as workers to protecting women
workers as women, describing the rise of legislation banning sex dis-
crimination in the workplace, and the tensions in that legislation
caused by competing visions of sex equality. Finally, Part III will
draw on lessons about enforcement of gender-protective7 legislation
from the era of the fire to today. It will conclude that legislation can
serve as a positive first step but, without broad consensus supporting
it, it tends to be under-enforced or wholly unenforced and therefore
not effective at achieving real or lasting social change. I end with a
brief application of these lessons to the Domestic Workers Bill of
Rights, New York’s recent extension of protections to home care
workers, the overwhelming majority of whom are women and many of
whom are immigrants, just like the labor force at the Triangle Shirt-
waist Factory in 1911.
I.
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
WOMEN’S WORK
In the early part of the twentieth century, the United States was in
the midst of the Second Industrial Revolution. Factory owners increas-
ingly relied on machines and redesigned the structure of work that
laborers did—changing the way that goods were produced, the tasks
that laborers performed, and the manner in which those tasks were
waist Factory Fire of 1911: Social Change, Industrial Accidents, and the Evolution of
Commonsense Causality, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 621 (1994).
7. The reader will note that I used “sex” in the prior sentence and “gender” in this
one. Sex and gender have slightly different meanings. Currently, “sex” is typically
used to refer to biological, genetic, or gonadal sex, whereas “gender” is usually used
to refer to that plus the roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that are considered to
be linked with sex. Gender was not considered separate from sex for most of the
history that I discuss. However, I will use both terms somewhat interchangeably, de-
pending on context throughout the article.
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performed—to enable mass production of goods.8 With this develop-
ment, workers were exposed to an increased likelihood and increasing
variety of ways to be injured or killed, not just because they were
working with machines, but also because the number of hours and the
pace at which they were required to work increased the stress on the
workers’ bodies from fatigue and made it much more difficult to be
careful.9 These dangers helped create the social conditions that gave
rise to the Progressive Era, in which a new group of social reformers
sought to use the law as a tool to remedy social problems.
Women played a large role as activists in the progressive move-
ment, in part because activism was one way that middle- and upper-
class women could engage in work and politics consistent with the
prevailing norm of separate spheres for men and women.10 Women
were viewed as too fragile for politics or most work,11 but morally
superior and thus well suited for charity work and caregiving.12 Much
of the reform sought in the Progressive Era was reform of the work-
place, primarily through improved working conditions and reduced
working hours. This strand of the Progressive Era movements pro-
8. See generally WALTER LICHT, INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA (1995).
9. See McEvoy, supra note 6, at 629–30, 641–43. R
10. In the Progressive Era, men and women were considered by most people to
have different natures. Men were better equipped to control the public sphere of polit-
ics and business, while women were better suited to the private sphere of the home.
NANCY F. COTT, NO SMALL COURAGE: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
180, 365 (2000). There was a moral component to women’s spheres; women were
thought to be above the dirty world of business and politics and were responsible for
maintaining a moral and religious haven for men and children. Id. at 365; see also
Alice Kessler-Harris, Problems of Coalition-Building: Women and Trade Unions in
the 1920s, in WOMEN, WORK & PROTEST: A CENTURY OF WOMEN’S LABOR HISTORY
110, 115 (Ruth Milkman ed., 1985).
11. The ideal of separate spheres did not operate in a uniform manner for all
women. Many women and girls worked outside of the home. Moreover, many
women, particularly those who immigrated from or whose ancestors immigrated (or
were taken) from countries outside of northern and western Europe, were not necessa-
rily viewed by most in the middle and upper class as part of the same system. See
COTT, supra note 10, at 187–93, 365–67 (describing working women, including slave R
women). Many African American women viewed work as natural for their gender,
and believed that women could work as well and as hard as men could. Rosalyn
Terborg-Penn, Survival Strategies Among African-American Women Workers: A
Continuing Process, in WOMEN, WORK & PROTEST: A CENTURY OF WOMEN’S LABOR
HISTORY, supra note 10, at 139–40. Still, separate spheres were an ideal, at least for a R
group of white women and some women within other demographic groups. See COTT,
supra note 10, at 365–66. See generally Nancy S. Dye, Introduction, in GENDER, R
CLASS, RACE, AND REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1–9 (Noralee Frankel & Nancy
S. Dye eds., 1991); DONNA GABACCIA, FROM THE OTHER SIDE: WOMEN, GENDER &
IMMIGRANT LIFE IN THE U.S., 1820-1990 (1994).
12. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE EARNING
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 114–16 (1983).
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vided another way for women to participate in politics while still act-
ing within their traditional nurturing and caregiving role.
Women in the Progressive Era also focused on increasing the
civil and political rights of women beyond their prescribed sphere, not
necessarily as a way to destroy the separateness of the spheres, but to
protect women within their sphere and to civilize the public sphere of
business and politics through their moral superiority.13 At first, re-
formers, at least those in the middle and upper classes, saw greater
participation by women in voting as a path to better conditions. The
National American Woman Suffrage Association, for example, as-
sumed that the vote would enable women workers to better protect
themselves in the workplace, which motivated at least some working
women to begin supporting the suffrage movement.14
A. Women, Work, and Labor Laws in the Progressive Era
During this time period, women made up about twenty percent of
the work force, and most were either single or had husbands who were
disabled from working.15 More than half of working women did
household work either in other people’s homes or by bringing piece-
work into their own homes.16 The remaining forty plus percent were
teachers, nurses, social workers, clerical workers, or unskilled blue-
collar workers.17 In 1905, the average weekly wage for women was
$5.25, but room and board for a single person was at least $2.25 per
week; on these wages, many women struggled to support their fami-
lies.18 The vast majority of women’s jobs were segregated by sex, but
when men and women performed the same work, men were paid up to
13. See generally ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, The Radicalism of the Woman Suffrage
Movement: Notes Toward the Reconstruction of Nineteenth-Century Feminism, in
WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 6–39 (1998).
14. JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN
193–94 (1991); see GABACCIA, supra note 11, at 87–88; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note R
12, at 95–98. R
15. BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HIS-
TORY PRACTICE, AND THEORY 95 (2d ed. 1996) (citing JULIE MATTHAEI, AN ECO-
NOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA: WOMEN’S WORK, THE SEXUAL DIVISION OF
LABOR, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM 187–232 (1982)); GABACCIA, supra
note 11, at 46. R
16. BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 95 (citing KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, R
at 141).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 95–96 (quoting PHILIP S. FONER, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 264–65 (1979)).
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300 percent more than their female counterparts.19 Jobs also tended to
be segregated, and thus pay was determined by race and class.20
The progressive movement sought to improve wages, hours, and
working conditions for all workers, but the legislation was piecemeal:
by industry, sex, or age of the worker.21 These legislative gains in
protective labor legislation at the turn of the century were frustrated by
the Supreme Court in the now infamous case of Lochner v. New York,
where the Court struck down legislation limiting the number of hours
that bakers could work to ten hours per day and sixty hours per week,
finding that the legislation was a violation of the freedom to con-
tract.22 The Court had previously allowed such protections for workers
in particularly dangerous occupations, but not for the average adult
worker.23 Against this backdrop, workers sought to organize to collec-
tively bargain for better conditions and wages with their employers,
and women workers were no exception.
Labor legislation specifically aimed toward protecting women
had more success. In the most famous case of sex-protective labor
legislation, Muller v. Oregon, the protective legislation in question
was upheld precisely because it focused on women.24 The Oregon
statute at issue limited the number of hours women could work in a
day to ten.25 While the Court acknowledged that, at least in Oregon,
women had the same freedom to contract as men did, it nonetheless
acknowledged that women’s wage work implicated a substantial pub-
19. Id.; see GABACCIA, supra note 11, at 49. R
20. BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 95–96; GABACCIA, supra note 11, at 46–47, R
49.
21. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 186–99, 203 (describing a number of R
laws that limited the types of jobs, number of working hours, or amount of wages for
women and sometimes minors). A description of other types of protective legislation
appears in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Examples are the New York statute at issue in that case limiting hours of labor in
bakeries, id. at 46, and a Utah law limiting the hours of miners, id. at 54–55.
22. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45, 57–63 (1905).
23. Id. at 54–55, 58–59 (noting that protections for workers in underground mines
and smelting operations and coal workers had been upheld in Holden v. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366 (1898), and Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13 (1901), on the
grounds that those occupations were dangerous to the health of workers). The Court in
Lochner suggested that the prior cases presented two justifications for the legitimate
use of the police power of the state to limit the hours of work a person could do: if the
members of the class suffered from a disability that made them less able to protect
their own interests, or if the work to be done was unusually dangerous. Id. at 57–62.
In Lochner, the Court proposed a third potential ground—injuries to the public caused
through demands on those workers. Id. at 57, 62–63.
24. 208 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1908).
25. Id. at 416–17.
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lic interest.26 Echoing much of the separate spheres of philosophy, the
Court held that states could protect women workers, not because they
were workers or workers in a particular industry, but because they
were women. Their status as workers was not irrelevant, but it was
their status as women that allowed the state to exercise its police
power to limit their work hours. The Court’s reasoning is worth quot-
ing extensively:
That woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence
is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood
are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the
medical fraternity[,] continuance for a long time on her feet at
work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon
the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous off-
spring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of
public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor
of the race.27
In other words, the Court reasoned that the rigors of work placed
women in physical danger, especially women who were pregnant or
who had young children. The Court seemed to assume that work that
happens “at work”—in other words, outside of a woman’s own
home—is different from and more rigorous than work that would take
place at home for that home.28 This assumption may have been true in
some cities for some classes of women, but not likely true in most
parts of the country for most classes of women at that time.29 The
notion that children’s health depends on their mothers’ health pro-
vided further basis for finding a public interest in women’s health;
26. Id. at 418–19, 422–23.
27. Id. at 421.
28. The Muller Court applied the medical testimony to the time women spent on
their feet “at work,” suggesting without discussion that the nature or amount of work
at a location was different from the nature or kind of work women did inside their
own homes. Id.
29. Christine Bose documents how work done by women in and outside of the
home in the early twentieth century was often the same kind of work, which actually
led to undercounting the number of women in the paid labor force. CHRISTINE E.
BOSE, WOMEN IN 1900: GATEWAY TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 22–52 (2001). Moreover, housework and farm labor, the kind of work at
home that the majority of women would have been doing, was very physically de-
manding. See also I.M. Rubinow & Daniel Durant, The Depth and Breadth of the
Servant Problem, 34 MCCLURE’S MAG. 576, 582–83, 585 (1910) (attributing part of
the dearth of domestic servants to the difficulty of housework as compared to factory
work); see generally COTT, supra note 10, at 358, 370–71 (describing the kind of R
work done at home by women during this time period); RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN,
MORE WORK FOR MOTHER: THE IRONIES OF HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGY FROM THE
OPEN HEARTH TO THE MICROWAVE 151–71 (1983) (same).
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conversely, this suggested that there was no corresponding public in-
terest in men’s health. Clearly, the Court viewed women as, while not
necessarily more fragile than men, naturally designed for motherhood
and mothering, rather than working for wages.
But that was not the only proffered justification for treating
women differently from men. The Court pragmatically recognized his-
torical realities of male dominance:
Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always been
dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset by
superior physical strength, and this control in various forms, with
diminishing intensity, has continued to the present. As minors,
though not to the same extent, she has been looked upon in the
courts as needing especial care that her rights may be preserved.
Education was long denied her, and while now the doors of the
school room are opened and her opportunities for acquiring knowl-
edge are great, yet even with that and the consequent increase of
capacity for business affairs it is still true that in the struggle for
subsistence she is not an equal competitor with her brother. Though
limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be removed
by legislation, there is that in her disposition and habits of life
which will operate against a full assertion of those rights. She will
still be where some legislation to protect her seems necessary to
secure a real equality of right. Doubtless there are individual excep-
tions, and there are many respects in which she has an advantage
over him; but looking at it from the viewpoint of the effort to main-
tain an independent position in life, she is not upon an equality.
Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly
placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protec-
tion may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary
for men and could not be sustained. It is impossible to close one’s
eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and depends upon
him.30
Strikingly, the Muller Court acknowledged both the fundamental
equality of women, in a legal or dignitary sense, but also their subordi-
nation through law and the practical effects of that subordination. The
Court noted that education had been denied women in the past and
acknowledged that limitations on women’s rights can be removed by
legislation, both of which suggest that the Court recognized that law
was among the factors responsible for women’s subordinate status.
But the Court also acknowledged that even once legal obstacles had
been removed, women would not be on an even field with men be-
cause of their history of subordination; the Court viewed law as a
30. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421–22.
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means to remedy the subordination that would remain. So, the Court
concluded, women needed legislation that treated them differently
than men to fully remedy their subordination. In other words, it was
this prior de jure and continued de facto subordination of persons who
should be considered equal in dignity and under the law that would
justify special treatment. Such focus on substantive equality at the ex-
pense of formal equality was relatively rare, though perhaps not as
rare as it is today.31 And yet, despite recognizing the historical subor-
dination of women and their legal and dignitary equality, the Court
seemed to retrench in its next comments. While it at least suggested
women and men were capable of the same successes if given the same
resources, the Court suggested that men’s dominance of women was
inevitable because women were less mentally and physically capable,
or at least less able to defend themselves from men, whom it saw as
unscrupulous by nature:
Even though all restrictions on political, personal and contractual
rights were taken away, and she stood, so far as statutes are con-
cerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with him, it would still be
true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon and look to
him for protection; that her physical structure and a proper dis-
charge of her maternal functions—having in view not merely her
own health, but the well-being of the race—justify legislation to
protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man. The limi-
tations which this statute places upon her contractual powers, upon
her right to agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor,
are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the bene-
fit of all. Many words cannot make this plainer. The two sexes
differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by
each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-
continued labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of
vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the self-
reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity
31. Compare Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672–78 (2009) (using formal
equality principles to hold that consideration of racial impact of a test was race dis-
crimination), with id. at 2681 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that a statute that
requires the government to provide substantive equality or equality of results may
violate the Equal Protection Clause), and id. at 2689 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (put-
ting the city’s actions in the context of a long history of race discrimination and pro-
moting the city’s actions as necessary for substantive equality). See also Rachel F.
Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Parents
Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1319 (2008) (discussing color-blind and color-conscious
approaches by the Supreme Court); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L.
REV. 945, 946 (1975) (arguing that the Court should promote political equality and
equality of opportunity, but refrain from promoting economic equality).
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to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a
difference in legislation and upholds that which is designed to com-
pensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her.32
Thus, the Court returned to its initial point, adding an essential-
ized view of male and female nature: women were essentially
mothers, essentially weaker, and essentially victims. Moreover,
women were the instruments that determined the nation’s health, not
because of the women themselves and their capabilities, but because
women give birth to future Americans, clearly a matter of public inter-
est. As a matter of public interest, the police power of the state could
be extended to limit the number of hours women worked in order to
protect their health. Tapping into powerful paternalistic stereotypes of
women was a successful strategy for worker protection proponents,33
and the Court’s decision in Muller is just one example of the tension
between equal treatment and “special” treatment for women that con-
tinues to inform the debate about equality in this country.
Muller helped pave the way for later cases that upheld maximum
hour and minimum wage legislation for all workers.34 Protective labor
legislation for all workers thus got its foot in the door through
women.35 But even for women, the law on the books was insufficient
by itself, and maximum hour legislation was just a first step.
B. Factory Conditions, the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire,
and Reactions
In the early nineteenth century, large numbers of women were
employed in the textile and garment industries, most of them “sweated
labor.”36 Factory owners typically “sweated” out the work by hiring
male subcontractors to produce their products, who in turn hired al-
most exclusively female workers to perform the labor.37 The subcon-
tractors determined the rate of pay for their workers and pocketed the
32. Muller, 208 U.S. at 422–23.
33. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 185–88. R
34. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding Oregon’s gender-neu-
tral maximum hours law); BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 108–11 (noting that R
Muller prompted Oregon’s passage of a maximum-hours law applicable to both men
and women).
35. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 183–84. R
36. For more information on the origins of the term “sweated labor” and the rise of
the sweatshop, see LAURA HAPKE, SWEATSHOP: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEA
17–24 (2004). Interestingly, the term was not necessarily seen as negative by the
women who worked as “sweated labor.” See id. at 33–34.
37. See Amy Kolen, Fire, 42 MASS. REV. 13, 21 (2001). This practice originally
grew out of piecework that seamstresses did for the government before and during the
Civil War. With improvements to the sewing machine and the entry of male subcon-
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difference between that and what the factory owners had paid them.38
Working conditions were terrible in most factories. The Triangle
Shirtwaist Factory, which produced inexpensive blouses for women
that were extremely fashionable at the time of the fire, was no
different.39
In the first decade of the twentieth century, workers had begun to
organize and join the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union.40
However, most of the industry remained unorganized, likely because
most female garment workers were uneducated young immigrants
who feared the potential repercussions of organizing. Unions, in turn,
viewed these women as too difficult to organize and did not try to
unionize them either.41 Despite the prevailing lack of organization, in
mid-November 1909, two hundred women walked out of the Triangle
Shirtwaist Factory to protest the discharge of workers for engaging in
organizing activity.42 Spurred in part by the Women’s Trade Union
League and the American Federation of Labor, workers across New
York City went on a general strike which became known as the
“Uprising of 20,000.”43 The strike lasted until February 1910, with
workers refusing to work until factory owners recognized their unions
and acceded to their demands for better wages, hours, and working
tractors into the process of garment production, conditions and wages deteriorated,
and the sweatshop was born. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 77–79. R
38. Kolen, supra note 37, at 21. R
39. ELIZABETH V. BURT, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 208–09 (2004); Kolen, supra note
37, at 21–23. R
40. Roger Waldinger, Another Look at the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’
Union: Women, Industry Structure, and Collective Action, in WOMEN, WORK & PRO-
TEST, supra note 10, at 86, 94–97; cf. PHILIP S. FONER, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN R
LABOR MOVEMENT: FROM THE FIRST TRADE UNIONS TO THE PRESENT 134–54 (1982)
(discussing women’s efforts to organize during this period and the history of the
Working Women’s Association).
41. See GABACCIA, supra note 11, at 86; see also Kessler-Harris, supra note 12, at R
113–17 (analyzing the dynamic between women and trade unions). Although organ-
ized labor viewed women and low-wage workers generally as unorganizable because
of a variety of prejudices, women had organized themselves at least sporadically to
carry on boycotts and strikes. See generally FONER, supra note 40, at 1–204. R
42. Kolen, supra note 37, at 14. In response to the walkout, the management of the R
Triangle Shirtwaist Company locked out the entire shop of five hundred workers,
causing the majority of those workers to join the strike. See FONER, supra note 40, at R
135.
43. See FONER, supra note 40, at 133–47; NANCY L. GREEN, READY-TO-WEAR AND R
READY-TO-WORK: A CENTURY OF INDUSTRY AND IMMIGRANTS IN PARIS AND NEW
YORK 54 (1997); ANNELISE ORLECK, COMMON SENSE & A LITTLE FIRE: WOMEN AND
WORKING CLASS POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1965, 53, 57–63 (1995). Esti-
mates of the number of strikers varies from 15,000 to 40,000. FONER, supra note 40, R
at 137.
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conditions in written agreements.44 The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory
owners did not sign an agreement, but they orally agreed to abide by
the terms common to those written agreements, which helped to end
the strike.45 Although wages and hours were covered by this oral
agreement, workplace conditions were not.46
The fire captured public sentiment in a powerful way. Thousands,
many of them hysterical and trying to help, witnessed it on the street
as it was happening, and days later, hundreds of thousands lined the
streets as a parade of caskets was taken to be buried.47 The fact that
the casualties of the fire were overwhelmingly women and girls
seemed a focal point for the media at the time. On the one hand, some
accounts blamed the tragedy on stereotypes of the women themselves,
attributing the death toll to female panic.48 On the other hand, many
media accounts emphasized the desperation that led the girls and
women to work for the factory, emphasizing how hard they worked,
that many of the workers were the primary breadwinners for their fam-
ilies, and the physical privations they endured to care for others.49
Many eyewitness reports that appeared in newspapers recounted the
stories of men’s actions during the fire, emphasizing how helpless
they felt to protect or save the women, exemplifying themes of male
valor and chivalry and female helplessness.50
Political actors in the city were mobilized as well:
44. McEvoy, supra note 6, at 631. R
45. Doors Were Locked Say Rescued Girls, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1911, at 3; cf.
McEvoy, supra note 6, at 631 (“[A]t Triangle the shirtwaist makers went back to R
work without union recognition and with few guarantees for improved working
conditions.”).
46. See ORLECK, supra note 43, at 63. R
47. McEvoy, supra note 6, at 644; 141 Men and Girls Die, supra note 2, at 1; R
300,000 in Fire Parade, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1911, at 1.
48. See Crowd of 50,000 Watches the Ruins, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1911, at 3; Lack
of Fire Drill Held Responsible, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 5 (noting that women
and girls panic at the prospect of a fire); Quick Grand Jury Fire Investigation, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 5 (“‘It seems apparent from a cursory inspection of the scene
that the great loss of life was due to panic . . . .’”); Supt. Miller Home; Won’t Talk of
Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1911, at 3.
49. 27 More Identified in Morgue Search, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1911, at 2; William
Mailly, The Triangle Trade Union Relief, AM. FEDERATIONIST, July 1911, at 544;
Miriam Finn Scott, The Factory Girl’s Danger, THE OUTLOOK, Apr. 15, 1911, at 817.
50. See 141 Men and Girls Die, supra note 2, at 1–3; Blame Shifted on All Sides for R
Fire Horror, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1911, at 1; Death List is 141; Only 86 Identified,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1911, at 4; Death List Shows Few Identified, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 1922, at 4; New York Fire Kills 148, CHICAGO SUNDAY TRIB., Mar. 26, 1911, at 1;
Stories of Survivors, supra note 1, at 4; Thrilling Incidents in Gotham Holocaust that R
Wiped out 150 Lives, CHICAGO SUNDAY TRIB., Mar. 28, 1911, at 2.
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Last night District Attorney Whitman started an investigation—not
of this disaster alone but of the whole condition which makes it
possible for a firetrap of such a kind to exist. Mr. Whitman’s inten-
tion is to find out if the present laws cover such cases, and if they
do not, to frame laws that will.51
Maximum hours legislation might have protected the workers at
the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory either by helping those workers to be
more careful or by having fewer workers at the factory during its oper-
ating hours. Woman-focused hours legislation had been previously en-
acted in New York in 1899, in response to reports by a legislative
committee created to investigate female labor in New York City at the
recommendation of then-governor Theodore Roosevelt.52 This legisla-
tion, however, was not enforced by the courts and was repealed a few
years later.53
Moreover, factory safety legislation had been in place, according
to the Wainwright Commission on Employers’ Liability with Regard
to the Prevention of Accidents and Fires in Factories (Wainwright
Commission), but had not been enforced.54 The Wainwright Commis-
sion released a report on April 20, 1911, less than a month after the
fire, decrying the poor enforcement of workplace safety laws:
This failure to enforce the safety regulations on buildings in the
course of construction is due, we believe, first to the fact that re-
sponsibility for enforcement is divided between the State Labor
Commissioner and the City Building Department and therefore not
seriously undertaken by either, and, second, to the fact that the law
has been interpreted to call for an inspection and enforcement only
on complaint. The practical result of enforcing a labor law on com-
plaint is that it is not enforced at all; the employer cannot be ex-
pected to complain against himself; the workman cannot in practice
51. 141 Men and Girls Die, supra note 2, at 1. R
52. BAKER, supra note 6, at 133, 150–51. R
53. Id. at 151–52; COMM’N APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAWS OF 1909
TO INQUIRE INTO THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS,
FOURTH REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1–7 (1911),
available at http://books.google.com/ebooks/reader?id=NCsoAAAAYAAJ&print-
sec=frontcover&output=reader&pg=GBS.RA1-PA249 [hereinafter COMM’N AP-
POINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518]. The state constitution was ultimately amended to
allow the state legislature to create a workers’ compensation system. See Compensa-
tion Law Makes Big Changes, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1914, at 11.
54. Say Laws Fail to Protect Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1911, at 8. The Wain-
wright Commission was created by the New York State Senate in 1909 to “inquire
into the working of a law in the State of New York relative to the liability of employer
to employees for industrial accidents . . . and . . . to the causes of accidents to employ-
ees.” COMM’N APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518, supra note 53, at 1. R
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be expected to complain against his employer; the passerby is too
busy or indifferent.55
Tests performed by the Commission convinced it that “the way to
procure comparative safety for workmen on buildings in the course of
construction, is to charge the enforcement of all safety regulations in
the first instance expressly on the City Building Departments.”56 Thus,
the Wainwright Commission concluded that even the best workplace
safety laws can only work as well as their enforcement mechanisms
will allow, and the existing divided responsibility scheme and reliance
on private complaints amounted to no accountability at all.
Partly in response to the fire, another state senatorial commission
was created, this time to investigate what remedial legislation might
be needed to protect the lives and health of factory workers: The Fac-
tory Investigation Commission.57 The commission issued yearly re-
ports from 1911 to 1915, culminating in a final report that
encompassed thirteen volumes.58 As a result of the commission’s
work between 1912 and 1915, New York enacted thirty-six laws,
largely focused on the safety and sanitation in the working environ-
ment, but also touching on wages and hours, and excluding women
and children entirely from certain types of work.59 Despite a promis-
ing start, this new legislation encountered enforcement problems, but
enforcement gradually improved60 until stronger federal worker pro-
tections were enacted in the New Deal.
The new legislation and the new political will towards enforce-
ment, which culminated in the financial difficulties that spawned the
reforms of the New Deal, began to make real changes for workers.
And the labor legislation protecting women was in little danger of
invalidation by the courts after Muller.61 Moreover, as the courts grad-
55. COMM’N APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518, supra note 54, at 16–17.
56. Id.; see also BAKER, supra note 6, at 284–88 (describing the lack of enforce- R
ment of labor laws because there was no adequately staffed state body).
57. BAKER, supra note 6, at 155–56. R
58. Id. at 156–57.
59. 1 N.Y. FACTORY INVESTIGATING COMM’N, FOURTH REPORT OF THE FACTORY
INVESTIGATING COMMISSION 2–11 (1915).
60. BAKER, supra note 6, at 292–307.
61. This was true for labor legislation that dealt with hours, health, or safety, but
not necessarily true for other kinds of labor legislation. In 1923, the Supreme Court
struck down a District of Columbia minimum wage law for women, reasoning in part
that the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment made women so equal that they no
longer needed special protections in the workplace. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923). Adkins was overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937), and the Court returned to the view that women workers warranted special
protection, id. at 394–95 (quoting Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)).
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ually backed away from the principles of Lochner, protective labor
legislation for all workers stood on firmer ground.
II.
THE SHIFT TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
The early successes in labor protection for women operated by
singling women out, much of the protective legislation of the early to
mid-twentieth century focused on workers as workers, and sometimes
on the basis of socio-economic class or particular industry. It was not
until the 1960s that the primary focus of protective labor legislation
would shift to protecting women specifically.
The early debates on protective labor legislation demonstrate a
serious conflict over whether sex-specific or sex-neutral legislation
would make women better off, and this debate continued well into the
second wave of the women’s movement in the 1960s and 1970s.62
Progressive female reformers used radical individualism to gain ac-
cess to political power, but many promoted an idealized vision of fe-
male morality, maternity, home, and family, which stressed
dependence and protection for women.63 However, the popularity of
sex-specific protective legislation waned. By the time the Nineteenth
Amendment had passed, the National Women’s Party, a group that
adopted a militant and national strategy for passage of the Amend-
ment, saw that neither suffrage nor sex-specific legislation had elimi-
nated sex discrimination in American life.64 The National Women’s
Party thus urged formal legal equality on the basis of sex and pro-
posed an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) for women.65 However, not
62. ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, NO TURNING BACK: THE HISTORY OF FEMINISM AND
THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 176 (2002); KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 184–85. R
Susan Faludi suggests that the debates continued into the 1980s and 1990s as well, but
she characterizes the debate as anti-feminist or neo-feminist versus feminist. SUSAN
FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR ON AMERICAN WOMEN 312–32 (1991)
(describing women activists who opposed an equal rights approach).
63. HOFF, supra note 14, at 202–03 (describing the work and words of activists and R
public figures); see also FONER, supra note 40, at 120–23 (noting the class differences R
in the movement); GABACCIA, supra note 11, at 87 (noting ethnic and class tensions in R
the Women’s Trade Union League); KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 86, 90–94, R
164–65, 212–13 (describing the class divisions among reformers and the idealization
of the domestic sphere by middle class women).
64. HOFF, supra note 14, at 206–08; see also COTT, supra note 10, at 420–21 R
(describing the effects for women in politics and the workplace of gaining the vote
and the shift to an Equal Rights Amendment after sex-specific laws were struck
down).
65. COTT, supra note 10, at 422–24; HOFF, supra note 14, at 206–09. The Equal R
Rights Amendment was first introduced in the 1920s. COTT, supra note 10, at 422; R
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everyone saw legal rights as a solution to women’s lack of equality.
Many women believed the fight was better won by attacking gender
norms and individual prejudice socially, thereby improving the eco-
nomic and social position of women without governmental
intervention.66
The dilemma that women seeking reform faced was quite serious.
On the one hand, all workers needed protection, but specifically pro-
tecting women ran the risk of reinforcing and justifying their subordi-
nation in society.67 On the other hand, because women were
subordinated, they lacked the bargaining or political power that men
had to obtain better conditions.68 When legislation provided sex-spe-
cific protections, as the early successful maximum hours legislation
did, women benefited in the short term from improvements to some of
the worst conditions women faced in the factories.69 In the long term,
however, the limitations tended to discourage employers from hiring
women.70 Employers were not motivated to hire women, whose hours
were limited by law, because they could hire men, whose hours were
not.71 In fact, some women working in traditionally male fields lost
jobs because of such legislation.72 Even though many men, repre-
sented in much higher proportions by unions, had been successful in
collectively bargaining for shorter hours and better pay,73 such that
treating women differently as a legislative matter meant that they were
treated more equally as a substantive matter, the legislation deterred
employers from hiring women altogether. Perhaps the legislation re-
HOFF, supra note 14, at 208. The Women’s Bureau was also created within the De- R
partment of Labor at about the same time. COTT, supra note 10, at 418; HOFF, supra R
note 14, at 208; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 171. The NWP did not wish to R
roll back sex-specific legislation at first, but did not see it as the path to empower-
ment, and grew to oppose it. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 207–10; see also R
COTT, supra note 10, at 422–24. R
66. GABACCIA, supra note 11, at 87–88. R
67. See BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 106–07 (citing comments of Rheta R
Childe Dorr, Editor of The Suffragist, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Sept. 1925, at 156–65);
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 213. R
68. BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 107–08 (citing comments of Mary Ander- R
son, Director of the Women’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING,
Sept. 1925, at 173, 180); KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 213. R
69. HOFF, supra note 14, at 200; see KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 211. R
70. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 192–95, 211. R
71. See BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 86–87, 111–12 (citing KESSLER-HAR- R
RIS, supra note 12, at 201–02, 212–14). R
72. Id. at 106.
73. See generally KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 206 (attributing the difference R
to the protection that unions gave men and the lack of organization of women, and
quoting a pamphlet from the National American Woman’s Suffrage Association justi-
fying its choice to lobby for sex-specific labor legislation).
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moved the cost advantage to employers of hiring women, perhaps
women’s work was presumed by employers to be of a lower quality,
or perhaps the gendered views of work at the time simply governed so
strongly that the laws gave employers the excuse to continue to prefer
men for at least some kinds of jobs.74
The Great Depression and New Deal provided the impetus for
enacting substantially more protective labor legislation that was sex-
neutral on its face. Among the broadest statutes enacted were those
that regulated wages and hours, provided income security for those
who could not work, and gave workers more power to demand more
from their employers. For example, at the federal level, the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) set a minimum wage and mandated extra pay
for hours worked over a weekly threshold for many workers.75 Al-
though worker injuries were not addressed comprehensively by the
federal government,76 most states enacted workers’ compensation sys-
tems to provide wage insurance and payment of medical bills for
workers injured or killed on the job.77 The Social Security Act created
a system of retirement, unemployment insurance, and welfare benefits
for poor families and people with disabilities.78 And finally, the Wag-
ner Act, which later became the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), gave workers the right to bargain collectively over wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.79
74. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN’S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 7–20, 194–96 (1991).
75. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201–19 (2006)).
76. Federal law did address injuries of some employees, those who worked for rail-
roads or on ships, for example. Federal Employers Liability Act, Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65
(1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2006)) (governing railroads);
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (codified as amended at
46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006)).
77. E.g., N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 13-g (McKinney 2011). New York’s
Workers’ Compensation Law, enacted in 1911, struck down, and enacted in a slightly
different form in 1914, was a product of the Wainwright Commission’s findings. PE-
TER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 11–13 (1998).
When the Supreme Court upheld New York’s law in N.Y. Central R.R. v. White, 243
U.S. 188 (1916), along with similar laws from Iowa, Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S.
210 (1917), and Washington, Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219
(1917), other states quickly enacted their own such laws; forty-two states by 1920,
and all states by 1949. LENCIS, supra, at 13; see also John Fabian Witt, Note, The R
Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842-1910, 107 YALE
L.J. 1467 (1998).
78. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 401–34 (2006)).
79. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151–69 (2006)).
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The practical effects of many of these laws did not benefit
women workers specifically, even though the laws did not suffer from
the theoretical problems and problems in application of the sex-spe-
cific laws. Social values played a large role in the lack of opportunities
for advancement available to women. The Great Depression led
American society to reassert traditional social values and to give men
preference in employment80 even though women’s participation in the
labor market, which had increased dramatically after World War I,
continued to increase steadily in the post-war, Depression, and post-
Depression years.81 Moreover, as explained in Part I, the labor market
was extremely sex-segregated at the time, and the structure of the new
laws, combined with the underlying gendered cultural norms that pre-
vailed in most segments of society, left women unprotected. For ex-
ample, the FLSA exempted from coverage professional and
administrative employees, including teachers, who were predomi-
nantly women.82 It also exempted in-home domestic and agricultural
workers;83 domestic and agricultural work were leading female occu-
pations at the time.84 Thus, even though the statute appeared to be sex-
80. HOFF, supra note 14, at 208; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 251–58, R
271–72. Married women in particular were the focus of public pressure to terminate
their employment or not seek work in the first place, and many employers explicitly
refused to employ married women. See JULIA KIRK BLACKWELDER, NOW HIRING: THE
FEMINIZATION OF WORK IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1995, at 105–07; COTT, supra
note 10, at 452–54; Martha May, Bread Before Roses: American Workingmen, Labor R
Unions and the Family Wage, in WOMEN, WORK & PROTEST, supra note 10, at 1, 13. R
81. BLACKWELDER, supra note 80, at 107–08; GABACCIA, supra note 11, at 51; R
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 116–17, 224–33. Women’s participation in the R
labor market continued to increase, albeit more slowly, during the Great Depression.
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 258–59. R
82. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006). The largest occupational category of professional
workers are teachers, and the vast majority of teachers below the college level have
historically been women. JOHN K. FOLGER & CHARLES B. NAM, EDUCATION OF THE
AMERICAN POPULATION 78–80 (reprt. ed. 1976), available at http://books.google.com/
books?id=Ira8D5bVU0UC&dq=education%20of%20the%20american%20popula-
tion&pg=PR1#v=onepage&q&f=false. From the 1930s to the 1960s, women made up
between eighty-five and ninety percent of elementary school teachers and about sixty-
five to forty-five percent of secondary school teachers. See id. at 80.
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(a)(5)–(6), (15), (b)(12), (21).
84. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 269–70. Domestic service ranked first R
among industries that employed women from 1870 to 1940. See JANET M. HOOKS,
WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WOMEN’S OCCUPATIONS THROUGH SEVEN
DECADES 52 (1947). Race played a large role as well in keeping both agricultural and
domestic service workers outside the FLSA’s protection. Peggie R. Smith, Aging and
Caring in the Home: Regulating Paid Domesticity in the Twenty-First Century, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1837 (2007). In fact, in 1940, three quarters of all employed African
American women worked in either domestic service or agricultural work. Mary C.
King, Occupational Segregation by Race and Sex, 1940-88, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
Apr. 1992, at 30.
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neutral, many women did not receive its protections because the wage
and hour provisions of the FLSA did not cover many traditionally fe-
male jobs.
The National Labor Relations Act provided what appeared to be
sex-neutral protections for all workers. In fact, collective bargaining
had helped some women attain improvements in their wages, hours,
and working conditions, including the agreements that ended the Up-
rising of 20,000 described in Part I.85 However, in the early twentieth
century, organized labor was dominated by men and trade unions dis-
criminated against women.86 For example, the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) fought to keep women from competing with men in the
labor market by banishing women from most jobs dominated by men
and sanctioning unequal pay based on sex even for equal work.87
Moreover, just as the FLSA excluded many female-dominated occu-
pations from coverage, the NLRA excluded domestic service workers
from its protections.88
The weaknesses in both approaches, equal rights and sex-specific
protections, were well summarized by Mary Ritter Beard, possibly the
first women’s historian, in the late 1930s.89 The equal rights approach
was rather ineffective in a society with so much social and economic
inequality. Sex-specific protective labor legislation did little to benefit
women or poor people of either sex who were not in the labor market,
as it also accepted the vast majority of social and economic inequality
in society.90 Both approaches accepted differences of power among
85. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. Marion Crain has also urged
that collective bargaining is the most powerful route to female empowerment and that
it is the only way to transform the underlying causes of a gendered market and family
structure, although she acknowledges that organized labor has not traditionally been
welcoming to women. See generally Marion G. Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challeng-
ing the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155 (1991).
86. GABACCIA, supra note 11, at 86; HOFF, supra note 14, at 193; KESSLER-HARRIS, R
supra note 12, at 86, 152–59, 202–03, 268–70. Even one of the most famous women R
in the labor movement, Mary “Mother” Jones, disapproved of women earning wages
and promoted gendered labor roles in her speeches. GABACCIA, supra note 11, at 106. R
87. HOFF, supra note 14, at 200–01; see GABACCIA, supra note 11, at 86. Not all R
trade unions promoted discrimination against women. The Knights of Labor had
worked to organize women in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Id. at 106;
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 86. Also, women had successfully organized R
themselves in a number of industries in the last half of the nineteenth century. KESS-
LER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 85–86. But see id. at 155–56 (stating that the AFL R
promoted equal pay as a way to drive women workers out of the work force).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
89. Beard’s opinion, which was solicited for the National Women’s Party’s publica-
tion Equal Rights, although it did not get published then, is reprinted in HOFF, supra
note 14, at 216–18. R
90. Id. at 217.
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classes of people, and both sought to emulate male standards for
women rather than addressing the root causes of inequality.91
World War II was a potential turning point. Labor shortages
caused by the shortage of men and increased demand for material
from the military increased women’s labor market opportunities sig-
nificantly, especially for African American women.92 At the same
time, however, the underlying gender norms of society had not
changed, and it is not clear that the increase in work available for or
taken by women had a significant impact on those norms.93 In what
might appear to have been an important advance, the federal govern-
ment seemed to promote sex equality as national policy by allowing
employers an exception to the strict wage control laws to raise
women’s wages to the level of men doing comparable work.94 How-
ever, this order was motivated by desire to maintain wage rates for
men who would presumably be returning to the jobs presently held by
those women, and Congress did not pass a proposed bill that would
have mandated equal pay.95 Although equal pay legislation continued
to be introduced for several years, Congress did not pass it, and no
progress on this front was made in the early post-war years.96 In the
years that followed, however, the rate of women’s participation in the
labor force climbed steadily such that by 1975, nearly half of all
women in the United States worked, and most of them worked full
time.97
91. See id. at 221.
92. COTT, supra note 10, at 482–84; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 273–99. R
The female labor force grew by more than forty-six percent in the early 1940s.
BLACKWELDER, supra note 80, at 123–24. And although labor market opportunities R
increased for African American women because more jobs were available due to the
absence of men and better jobs became available as white women were given even
better opportunities, racial discrimination and segregation still resulted in higher un-
employment rates for African American women, id. at 128–31, and employment in
usually the least desirable jobs. Id.; COTT, supra note 10, at 482–83. R
93. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 274–99. By February of 1946, more than R
two-thirds of the female wartime entrants to the labor force had left it. BLACKWELDER,
supra note 80, at 123–24. R
94. Nat’l War Labor Bd. Gen. Order No. 16 (1942), reprinted in WARTIME WAGE
CONTROL AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: LAWS, REGULATIONS, GENERAL ORDERS, DI-
RECTORS, OFFICIAL INTERPRETATIONS, POLICY STATEMENTS 135–36 (1945).
95. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 289–90; see also COTT, supra note 10, at R
484. Five states did pass legislation mandating equal pay for men and women: New
York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Illinois, and Rhode Island. Dorothy S. Brady, Equal
Pay—What Are the Facts?, in Women’s Bureau Bull. No. 243, Report of the National
Conference on Equal Pay 14–15 (1952), cited in KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at R
381.
96. See COTT, supra note 10, at 484; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 298. . R
97. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 301. These increases were seen in married R
women and women with young children, in addition to the demographic groups that
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The Cold War saw greater pressure for federal legislation to sup-
port women’s wage work. The reformers sought a program for paid
maternity leave for federal workers, programs to provide job training
for women in nontraditional fields, adjustment of resources to promote
childcare and housekeeping services for working women, policies and
programs to encourage part-time employment, government criticism
of policies that required or encouraged women to leave the workforce
or not enter it in the first place, and reform of the Social Security
program to provide sex equality in Social Security benefits.98 As part
of President Johnson’s War on Poverty, federal programs to provide
job training for women and child care for mothers were created.99 In
addition, public support for the ERA rose in this era, as did pressure to
enact legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment on the ba-
sis of sex.100 However, there was significant resistance to this more
aggressive equality legislation, which could have limited the power of
governments to classify on the basis of sex, invalidated existing legis-
lation, or coerced private parties into refraining from
discrimination.101
The executive branch also became more involved in developing
and implementing equality policies. President Kennedy, at the urging
of Esther Peterson, Director of the Women’s Bureau, and Vice Presi-
dent Johnson, created a national Commission on the Status of Women
in 1961.102 This marked a renewed political effort for legislative solu-
tions to promote women’s equality. In addition, the Equal Pay Act was
passed in 1963.103 While the passage of the statute was an important
victory, it fell somewhat short of what many activists desired. The
Equal Pay Act was introduced at least in part to take attention away
from the ERA,104 and did not apply to domestic or agricultural work-
had traditionally worked for wages. See COTT, supra note 10, at 493–94, 534, 576; R
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12,. at 302–03 R
98. COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOMEN (1963); see also
COTT, supra note 10, at 535–37; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 304. R
99. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 312. During the Nixon Administration, R
Congress had passed the Comprehensive Child Development Act, which would have
created day care facilities available to all children regardless of a family’s ability to
pay. COTT, supra note 10, at 582. President Nixon vetoed the legislation. Id. R
100. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 305–11. R
101. COTT, supra note 10, at 533–36; see also KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at R
313.
102. HOFF, supra note 14, at 231–32; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 313. R
103. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006)).
104. HOFF, supra note 14, at 232 (quoting Esther Peterson, who urged creation of the R
President’s Commission on the Status of Women to “substitute constructive recom-
mendations for the present troublesome and futile agitation about the ‘equal rights
amendment,’” and who helped introduce and usher the Equal Pay Act through Con-
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ers because it was tied to the Fair Labor Standards Act.105 Moreover,
while the Equal Pay Act originally called for equal pay for “work of
comparable character on jobs [that require] comparable skills,”106 a
concept of comparable worth that might address pay disparities caused
by sex segregation in occupations, the language enacted required
equal pay for “equal work,” which cabined the inquiry to jobs that
would be nearly identical, precluding any remedy to pay disparities
caused by occupational sex segregation.107
The following year, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted,
prohibiting discrimination in employment because of race, color, na-
tional origin, religion, or sex.108 Sex was added to the list of statuses
protected by Title VII at the last minute by a Southern Democrat, and
gress). The move to take attention away from the ERA was not necessarily motivated
by a desire to maintain gender inequality or to avoid difficult political issues. Notably,
this mirrored the fight over protective legislation versus equal rights in the Progressive
Era. COTT, supra note 10, at 534–36. R
105. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 314. R
106. HOFF, supra note 14, at 233. R
107. The Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 209, 211, 213, 215–19, 255–56, 259–60, 262 (2006)). The act
defines “equal work” as that work “the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility, [for jobs] which are performed under similar working condi-
tions, except where such payment [difference] is made pursuant to . . . any factor other
than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206. While comparing skill, effort, and responsibility could
provide some flexibility to remedy pay disparities caused by occupational segregation,
by allowing a defense when the difference is based on any factor other than sex, the
statute effectively limits its application to situations where men and women with the
same qualifications, experience, and length of service are doing the same job. An
alternative approach, which would have addressed the inequality associated with oc-
cupational sex segregation, was “comparable worth,” where pay would be determined
not by job category, but by assessing substantially equal work that required similar
amounts of training, skill, and judgment to perform and that provided services at the
same level of importance to society. See COTT, supra note 10, at 582–83; HOFF, supra R
note 14, at 253. This alternative approach has been very controversial. See, e.g., Mary R
E. Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for Addi-
tional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934 (1986);
Daniel R. Fischel & Edward P. Lazear, Comparable Worth and Discrimination in
Labor Markets, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 891, 892–93 (1986); Ronnie J. Steinberg, Social
Construction of Skill: Gender, Power, and Comparable Worth, 17 WORK & OCCUPA-
TIONS 449, 455, 476 (1990). The Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that compa-
rable worth was a valid legal theory, at least in the narrow situation in which Title VII
was used to challenge pay practices where there were no male employees performing
substantially equal work for higher wages. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161 (1981); HOFF, supra note 14, at 253. The following year also saw a judicial R
contribution to combating occupational sex segregation when the Court held unconsti-
tutional a nursing school’s exclusion of men because it tended to perpetuate the stere-
otype that nursing was women’s work. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 729–31 (1982).
108. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (2006)).
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there is almost no legislative history indicating what Congress thought
sex equality should look like.109 Although it is widely believed that
this addition was designed to defeat the bill,110 some evidence sug-
gests that a significant number of representatives and senators ap-
proved the amendment and voted for the Act because it would also
promote sex equality.111 The evidence is somewhat equivocal in part
because less than fifty percent of the House actually voted for the
addition of the word “sex” in Title VII.112 The push to legislate
against sex discrimination was not accidental, though. Activists were
also working to get states and municipalities to prohibit sex discrimi-
nation in employment through legislation, and successfully en-
couraged President Johnson to issue executive orders prohibiting sex
discrimination by federal contractors and requiring them to institute
affirmative action programs.113
These legislative changes and the debates surrounding them re-
vealed the tension between the gender norm of women as primarily
focused on home and family and the anti-discrimination norm, which
focused on allowing women greater access to the public sphere.114
They also revealed the tension between policies that sought to protect
women workers because they lacked substantive equality with men
and policies that treated men and women equally for purposes of ac-
cess to social goods like jobs.115 These tensions in many ways mir-
rored the special treatment and equal treatment debates of the early
twentieth century;116 in both time periods, these tensions resulted in
109. 110 CONG. REC. H2577-84 (1964).
110. COTT, supra note 10, at 547; HOFF, supra note 14, at 233–34; KESSLER-HARRIS, R
supra note 12, at 314; see 110 CONG. REC. H2577-84 (reflecting suspicion by mem- R
bers of Congress of the sponsor’s motivations). Representative Smith, the sponsor of
this addition, denied that defeating the bill was his motive. HOFF, supra note 14, at R
233.
111. MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN’S RIGHTS, AND
THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1986) (describing how Represen-
tative Martha Griffiths (D.-Mich.) rallied support among the many northern Demo-
crats and by Republicans for inclusion of sex as a protected status); see also
ROSALIND ROSENBERG, DIVIDED LIVES: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY 188 (2008); COTT, supra note 10, at 547–48. Representative Griffiths and Sena- R
tor Margaret Chase Smith successfully held the entire bill hostage to defeat an effort
to remove the word “sex” in committee. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 314. R
112. HOFF, supra note 14, at 233. Forty percent of the members of the House were R
absent from the vote count on the bill. Id.
113. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966–1970); Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3
C.F.R. 803 (1966–1970).
114. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 315–17. R
115. Id.
116. See HOFF, supra note 14, at 259–75, 296–98, 317–18, 330–31, 356–64. R
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backlash against the legislation and the movement for a constitutional
amendment.117
Not all of the legislative developments during this time period
focused on discrimination and sex. Another important worker protec-
tion, one that was gender-neutral, was enacted that focused on workers
as a class, and it was arguably the legislative development that would
have helped the victims of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire the
most. Enacted in 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Act sought
to create minimum standards for worker safety in most workplaces in
the country.118 That statute created the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration to promulgate safety standards and regulations,
and to enforce them along with the substantive provisions of the
Act.119
Despite this example, most of the protective legislation enacted
since the 1960s has been directed toward protecting narrow classes of
people specifically. During this time period, legislation to protect
women was enacted, cases were brought to enforce and expand equal-
ity guarantees,120 and women continued to participate in the labor
force in ever-increasing numbers and in increasingly diverse jobs,
even though significant sex segregation persisted.121 In 1972, Title VII
was amended to apply to state and local governments and to give the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission the power to bring suits
against employers for discriminating in the workplace.122 The ERA
passed in Congress and was sent to the states for ratification.123 Later
117. Id. at 234, 245; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 317–18. See generally R
FALUDI, supra note 62 (documenting the backlash against the women’s movement in R
the 1980s and 1990s).
118. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 656 (2006). The decision and enforcement are exercised under the
power of the Secretary of Labor. See § 655.
120. HOFF, supra note 14, at 245–47. For an excellent summary of the actions of the R
three branches of the federal government and the actions of social movement activists,
see id. at 236–44, comparing these activities in a chart that traces from 1963 to 1990,
and id. at 395–407, summarizing legislation, executive orders, and Supreme Court
cases from 1963 to 1990. Some of these actions were Supreme Court decisions, a list
of which is provided infra note 1267. R
121. COTT, supra note 10, at 577–80. R
122. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972).
123. That ratification stalled, three states shy of the number needed. Some of the
credit for defeating the ERA must go to Phyllis Schlafly’s group STOP ERA, which
not only opposed an equal rights approach to sex issues but also advocated for tradi-
tional values and gender roles. See FALUDI, supra note 62, at 232–35 (tracing the New R
Right’s rise to passage of the ERA in 1972 and the recognition of a fundamental right
to abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); HOFF, supra note 14, at 321–25 R
(describing Schlafly’s group).
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that year, the Patsy T. Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act,
popularly known as Title IX, was passed, prohibiting recipients of fed-
eral funds from discriminating, including in employment, on the basis
of sex.124 Two years later, the Women’s Educational Equity Act insti-
tuted funding for educational programs and research that benefited
women and girls. The Act also encouraged them to enter nontradi-
tional fields.125 In 1975, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act was en-
acted, prohibiting discrimination in credit provision on the basis of
sex.126 Finally, in 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act to make clear that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
constituted discrimination on the basis of sex within the meaning of
Title VII, superseding the Supreme Court’s holding that it did not.127
Several Supreme Court cases during this time period considered
state law restrictions on women in many aspects of their lives.128
Many of these restrictions were struck down as violations of the Con-
stitution, and provisions that classified on the basis of sex became sub-
ject to heightened scrutiny.129 These constitutional decisions
supplemented the federal legislation that was being enacted by limit-
ing the ways that states could enforce their own laws limiting the
rights of women.
124. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (1972) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681–88 (2006)).
125. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 554 (1974).
126. Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974).
127. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2006)) (overruling Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that dis-
criminating on the basis of pregnancy was not discrimination “based upon gender as
such”)).
128. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that classifications on the
basis of sex warranted intermediate scrutiny); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975) (striking down laws that kept women off juries on the basis of sex); Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
was not discrimination on the basis of sex warranting any sort of heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974) (striking down a law requiring mandatory unpaid maternity leave as a violation
of the Due Process Clause); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality)
(stating that sex should be considered a suspect class); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (recognizing that the constitutional right to privacy extended to decisions to
terminate a pregnancy and limiting the ability of states to prevent exercise of that
right); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a state law that gave men
automatic preference to be executors of estates as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a fundamental right to
privacy prevented states from prohibiting access to contraception).
129. E.g., Boren, 429 U.S. 190. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the legislation at
issue bear a substantial relationship to an important government purpose. Id. at 197-
98.
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Of all of these developments, Title VII and Title IX represented
particularly important gains for women in the workplace and educa-
tion. They have not been uniformly successful at ending discrimina-
tion, however. The reasons for this lack of success are more fully
explored in Part III but, in short, it can be attributed to a combination
of design flaws, the stickiness of gender norms, the way status-based
rights work, and the lack of support for a broad or flexible application
of the laws.
While the 1970s were a particularly active time for women’s
equality, the 1980s also saw some attempts to promote equality for
women. In 1981, the first Economic Equity Act was introduced in
Congress.130 This legislation sought a number of changes: 1. it sought
to eliminate sex distinctions in a number of areas including in benefits
provided to armed services members; 2. it sought to restructure a num-
ber of programs in order to make marital status irrelevant or to benefit
spouses equally regardless of sex; 3. it sought to restructure the tax
code to provide greater recognition of the contributions of homemak-
ers; 4. it sought to support child care programs; and 5. it sought to
prohibit discrimination in insurance.131 That legislation did not pass,
but it did form the basis for child support and pension legislation in
the 1980s.132
Despite the introduction of this expansive legislation, the 1980s
saw a decrease in executive and judicial support for sex discrimination
legislation.133 For example, the executive branch during both the Rea-
130. H.R. 3117, 97th Cong. (1981); S. 888, 97th Cong. (1981); HOFF, supra note 14, R
at 273.
131. See H.R. 3117; S. 888. While the bills themselves cannot be found online, in-
formation about the legislation, including a summary of it, can be found by searching
the Library of Congress’ THOMAS database. THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
thomas.php# (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
132. See HOFF, supra note 14, at 241, 273–74, 402. The Economic Equity Act was a R
broad bill, focused on gender equity, but the child support and pension legislation that
eventually passed had been part of less comprehensive bills. The Child Support En-
forcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 657–662 (2006)) (requiring states to strengthen their support laws, to enact
guidelines for the appropriate amount of support, and provide greater assistance to
collect that support, providing grants to improve interstate enforcement of child sup-
port orders); The Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1433
(1984) (amending the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Internal
Revenue Code to ensure that women who took time out of the workforce for chil-
drearing and surviving and divorced spouses were treated more equitably by the re-
tirement plan of their own employer or their former spouses’ employer).
133. The 1980s also represented a period of erosion of other rights at the federal and
state level that had helped women achieve independence through control of their re-
productive health with access to contraception and abortion. During the same time
period, however, real legislative gains were made at the state level through reform of
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gan and Bush administrations issued statements critical of affirmative
action, comparable worth, and class action suits to enforce discrimina-
tion laws.134 And after the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of
Title IX narrowly and broadening legislation was introduced, it was
defeated by filibuster three years in a row.135 The Civil Rights Resto-
ration Act finally overcame a filibuster in 1987, passed, and was ve-
toed by President Reagan.136 Congress overrode that veto in 1988.137
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, sex discrimination legislation
enjoyed a resurgence. In 1990, Congress passed legislation requiring
large companies to give up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to work-
ers for the birth or adoption of a child, or for their own or a family
member’s serious illness.138 That legislation was vetoed by President
Bush, but was eventually enacted and signed into law by President
Clinton in 1993 as the Family and Medical Leave Act.139 In 1991,
Congress amended Title VII to supersede Supreme Court opinions that
had interpreted Title VII too narrowly, and to provide for compensa-
tory and punitive damages for successful plaintiffs and for jury tri-
als.140 In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act,141
which, among other things, created a federal right to be free from
crimes motivated by gender and a cause of action for damages for
the criminal laws related to domestic violence, sexual assault, and rape. A thorough
discussion of the expansion and contraction of reproductive rights and resources to
support reproductive choice, as well as discussion of other issues that relate to
women’s well being, like laws regulating marriage and divorce, property rights, vio-
lence against women, pornography, women’s health, and sexual autonomy are beyond
the scope of this article.
134. HOFF, supra note 14, at 241. The Justice Department and the Civil Rights Com- R
mission, as well as officials within those organizations, issued statements hostile to
affirmative action, id., and comparable worth, Linda M. Blum & Peggy Kahn, Com-
parable Worth, in THE READER’S COMPANION TO U.S. WOMEN’S HISTORY 119, 121
(Wilma Mankiller et al. eds., 1998). Hoff does not specify which other organizations,
if any, the other criticism came from. HOFF, supra note 14, at 241. This criticism was R
bolstered by conservative social movement activists seeking to reverse legislation and
executive and judicial branch support for equal rights on the basis of sex and sex
equity in all aspects of American life. FALUDI, supra note 62, at 229–56 (describing R
the efforts of the Heritage Foundation and other New Right groups in the 1980s).
135. HOFF, supra note 14, at 241–42, 256. R
136. Id. at 242, 256–57.
137. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988); HOFF, supra note 14, at 257. R
138. HOFF, supra note 14, at 244. R
139. Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 2, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54
(2006)); HOFF, supra note 13, at 244. R
140. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
141. Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001–40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1796–1956 (1994)
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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anyone, male or female, injured by gender-motivated violence.142 Al-
though this provision of the act was invalidated by the Supreme Court
as exceeding Congress’ Commerce Clause powers,143 funding provi-
sions of the legislation and other reforms remain.144
Currently, we are experiencing yet another resurgence in legisla-
tive efforts to combat discrimination on the basis of sex and to pro-
mote sex equity and equality. Fair pay issues have been a primary
focus. For example, in 2009, President Obama signed into law the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which amended Title VII to clarify that
its short statute of limitations begins running with each paycheck that
carries out discriminatory pay.145 Additionally, as part of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act was
amended to require employers to give women covered by the statute
reasonable breaks and a location that is not a bathroom to express
breast milk.146
Legislation is currently pending to provide greater enforcement
and remedies for pay discrimination147 as well as equal pay for
142. Id. at § 40302, 108 Stat. at 1941 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)). The
statute also: created training and grant programs; created a national domestic violence
hotline; required a coordinated community response to domestic violence, sexual as-
sault, and stalking crimes; strengthened federal penalties for repeat sex offenders and
included a federal rape shield law; required states and territories to give full faith and
credit to orders of protection issued by other states, tribes, and territories; and created
legal relief for battered immigrants. See generally Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§§ 40001–40703, 108 Stat. at 1796–1956 (1994). The Act was reauthorized in 2000,
and an Office on Violence against Women (OVW) was created in the Department of
Justice to provide technical assistance and grants to groups developing programs,
practices, or policies aimed at ending violence against women in the form of domestic
violence, dating violence, sexual violence, and stalking. The grant programs were also
expanded, as were interstate stalking laws and immigration protections. Pub. L. No.
106-386, §§ 1001–1603, 114 Stat. 1464, 1464–91 (2000) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of the U.S.C.). The most recent reauthorization act created programs to help
trafficking victims, to increase the federal DNA database, and to provide the grant
programs administered by the OVW. Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).
143. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
144. Cf. id. (ruling that only 42 U.S.C. § 13981 was beyond Congress’ power).
145. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). The legislation had originally been intro-
duced in 2007 in response to Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 550 U.S. 618
(2007), in which the Supreme Court had held that the statute of limitations began
running when the original discriminatory decision was made but did not start anew
with each paycheck. H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1843, 110th Cong. (2007).
The bills died in the Senate in 2008. See Bill Summary and Status, 110th Congress
(2007-2008), H.R. 2831, All Congressional Actions, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR02831:@@@X.
146. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4207, 124 Stat. 119, 577 (2010) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(r) (2006 Supp. IV)).
147. Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1519, 112th Cong. (2011); Paycheck Fairness Act,
S. 797, 112th Cong. (2011). The same legislation passed the House in 2008, but died
31043-nyl_14-3 Sheet No. 37 Side A      12/02/2011   08:53:16
31043-nyl_14-3 Sheet No. 37 Side A      12/02/2011   08:53:16
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\14-3\NYL304.txt unknown Seq: 29  1-DEC-11 14:38
2011] CONSENSUS, DISSENSUS, AND ENFORCEMENT 673
equivalent jobs.148 Several pieces of legislation to provide paid family
or medical leave are also pending,149 as are bills to prohibit discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation or identity,150 to end the ex-
clusion of women from military ground combat,151 to promote
women-owned businesses,152 and to promote opportunities for aca-
demic jobs in the sciences and engineering for women.153 There have
even been proposals to amend the Constitution to ensure sex equality
and reproductive rights154 and to remove the ratification deadline for
the ERA in order to reinvigorate it.155 Whether these bills have the
political support for enactment or the public interest to spur debate and
action remains to be seen.
in the Senate. See Bill Summary and Status, 110th Congress (2007–2008), H.R. 1338,
All Congressional Actions, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d110:h.r.01338:. In 2010, it passed the House, but fell two votes short of
cloture in the Senate. See Bill Summary and Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010),
H.R. 12, All Congressional Actions, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d111:HR00012:.
148. Fair Pay Act of 2011, H.R. 1493, 112th Cong. (2011).
149. E.g., Federal Employees Paid Parental Leave Act of 2011, H.R. 616, 112th
Cong. (2011); Family and Medical Leave Enhancement Act of 2011, H.R. 1440,
112th Cong. (2011); Healthy Families Act, H.R. 1876, 112th Cong. (2011); Healthy
Families Act, S. 984, 112th Cong. (2011); Family Economic Success Act, S.10, 112th
Cong. (2011).
150. Employment Nondiscrimination Act, H.R.1397, 112th Cong. (2011).
151. Women’s Fair and Equal Right to Military Service Act, H.R.1928, 112th Cong.
(2011).
152. Women’s Business Ownership Act of 2011, H.R. 744, 112th Cong. (2011).
153. Fulfilling the Potential of Women in Academic Science and Engineering Act of
2011, H.R. 889, 112th Cong. (2011).
154. H.J. Res. 31, 112th Cong. (2011). The text of the proposed amendment
provides:
Article–
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. Reproductive rights for women under the law shall not be de-
nied or abridged by the United States or any State.
Section 3. Congress shall have power to enforce and implement this arti-
cle by appropriate legislation.
Section 4. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
155. H.R.J. Res. 47, 112th Cong. (2011). The text of the proposed amendment
provides:
That notwithstanding any time limit contained in House Joint Resolution
208 of the Ninety-second Congress, second session, the article of amend-
ment proposed to the States in that joint resolution shall be valid to all
intents and purposes as part of the Constitution whenever ratified by three
additional States.
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III.
DISSENSUS AND THE FAILURE OF ENFORCEMENT
As the discussion in Part II helps to demonstrate, the road to
equality in this country has been long and slow. With one of the great-
est legislative milestones in that movement, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, enacted almost half a century ago, activists and
scholars are expressing ever more frustration that we haven’t reached
our destination yet.156 The problem is not, as some claim, simply one
of remedies, a hostile judiciary, overly complicated legal analyses, or
ever-craftier discriminators. These all may be significant problems,
but they are dwarfed in importance by the fundamental fact that in this
country we lack consensus on what discrimination is, what practices
are discriminatory, and what role the government should take in re-
dressing such practices. Without a greater level of consensus, our laws
that prohibit “discriminat[ion] . . . because of” sex cannot possibly be
effective.157
Title VII and the other laws that prohibit status-based discrimina-
tion in the workplace were enacted to create social change.158 But the
words of a statute alone cannot accomplish change, especially when
those words address broad concepts. Those who enforce the law and
those who obey it must interpret those words, and their interpretations
will inevitably be framed by their individual perspectives.
The critics of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shared this concern,
although they were primarily concerned that Title VII went too far to
156. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidis-
crimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 & n.3, 5–6 (2006); R. Richard Banks et al.,
Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV.
1169 (2006); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Toward a New Civil Rights Framework, 30
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 353 (2007); Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?,
79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 899, 900 (2005).
157. Title VII uses these terms in its prohibition of discrimination. It provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
158. ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 4 (1993) (arguing that “the effort to ameliorate
long standing patterns of race and sex subordination [through Title VII] is perhaps the
most ambitious social reform effort ever undertaken in America.” (emphasis added)).
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promote equality. As the authors of the minority report of the House
Judiciary Committee wrote, “The depth, the revolutionary meaning of
this act, is almost beyond description. It cannot be circumscribed, it
cannot be said that it goes this far and no farther. The language written
into the bill is not of that sort.”159 A separate minority report further
bemoaned, “With all of its concern for inequality in employment op-
portunities, [Title VII] wholly fails to define ‘equality.’ Nowhere in
the title can be found language to guide the [Equal Employment Op-
portunity] Commission in its investigation of charges of racial
discrimination.”160
If racial equality was problematic on this score, sex equality was
exponentially more problematic. As explained in Part II, sex was ad-
ded to the list of statuses protected by Title VII at the last minute, and
there is almost no legislative history suggesting what Congress
thought sex equality meant.161 The first director of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, in fact, considered the inclusion of
“sex” in the statute a “fluke,” and largely sought to ignore it.162 That
proved impossible, however; more than a third of the charges the
agency processed in its first year were sex discrimination charges, and
women activists increased the pressure to take sex discrimination seri-
ously, in part through the struggle for ratification of the ERA, begin-
ning in 1972.163 As the renewed focus on the ERA by activists might
suggest, formal equality became firmly entrenched as the legal model
of sex equality.164 In fact, Title VII was quickly used to strike down
159. E.E. WILLIES ET AL., MINORITY REPORT UPON PROPOSED CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1963, COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY SUBSTITUTE FOR H.R. 7152, reprinted in EQUAL EM-
PLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2069 (1968).
160. RICHARD H. POFF & WILLIAM CRAMER, SEPARATE MINORITY VIEWS OF HON.
RICHARD H. POFF AND HON. WILLIAM CRAMER, reprinted in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 159, at 2110. R
161. 110 CONG. REC. H2577-84 (1964) (providing the only discussion of adding
“sex” to the list of protected classes, most of which did not give examples of what sex
discrimination was, and noting in part that the topic was not addressed in any of the
hearings about the bill).
162. Herman Edelsberg, Exec. Dir., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Statement at
the New York University Annual Conference on Labor (Aug. 25, 1966), in 62 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 253–55 (1966) (referring to the addition as “conceived out of wed-
lock” and viewing men as entitled to female secretaries); see also FLORA DAVIS,
MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1960 46–47
(1999); HOFF, supra note 14, at 235; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: R
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 252–53 (2008).
163. See HOFF, supra note 14, at 235; ROSENBERG, supra note 162, at 253–56. R
164. See HOFF, supra note 14, at 235 (noting that numerous lower courts in the R
1970s held that Title VII superseded sex-specific protective legislation). The operative
text of the Equal Rights Amendment is substantially similar to the text of the Four-
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the sex-specific protective state legislation enacted in the early part of
the twentieth century.165
The entrenchment of formal equality does not demonstrate con-
sensus on what sex discrimination is, however.166 The lack of consen-
sus about what equality means for women among reformers at the
time of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire carried over to the enact-
ment of Title VII and its early enforcement. Even more troubling, as
explained in Part II, we continue to lack consensus on what sex equal-
ity means in 2011. Our current lack of consensus on what discrimina-
tion means may be a result of the kind of ossification that develops
when laws are not regularly revisited and when court interpretations
pile up, and the principal evil the law has sought to prohibit becomes
teenth Amendment. Compare S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong. 86 Stat. 1523, 118 Cong. Rec.
9598 (1972) (“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of sex”), and H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong.,
117 CONG. REC. 35815 (1971), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; . . . nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”). Because that language from the Fourteenth Amendment has been inter-
preted to embody a norm of formal equality, that same language in the ERA would
likely be interpreted the same way. See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination
Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1014 (1986)
(arguing that the Court usually uses a formal equality model for the Fourteenth
Amendment); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1474–75
(2004) (noting that the formal-equality rationale dominates the “modern equal protec-
tion tradition”).
165. E.g., Rosenfeld v. So. Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
166. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
16–22 (2d ed. 2003) (describing differing approaches to equality among feminist ac-
tivists and theorists); FREEDMAN, supra note 62 (describing the history of approaches R
to feminism and sex equality); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (documenting studies that suggest
that women and men may think and act differently, but suggesting that any hierarchy
based on those differences is socially constructed); BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY:
FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984) (critiquing views of sex discrimination that posit an
“essential woman”); LISTEN UP: VOICES FROM THE NEXT FEMINIST GENERATION (Bar-
bara Findlen ed., 1995) (third-wave feminist essay collection); CATHARINE A. MACK-
INNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 143–213 (1979) (describing two
approaches to sex discrimination and arguing that harassment is discrimination under
either approach); CAROL SMART: FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 66–89 (1989)
(discussing the theoretical approaches to sex discrimination). There are also those who
disagree that society discriminates on the basis of sex at all, or who argue that if
society does discriminate, the feminist movement itself has created that discrimina-
tion. E.g., SUZANNE VENKER & PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE FLIPSIDE OF FEMINISM:
WHAT CONSERVATIVE WOMEN KNOW – AND MEN CAN’T SAY (2011); see also
FALUDI, supra note 62 (describing the way that the media, the Reagan and Bush ad- R
ministrations, and some academics portrayed the feminist movement as the cause of
most of women’s problems in the late twentieth century).
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more distant in time.167 But we do not even have clear first principles
courts could draw on to spur innovation because of the lack of consen-
sus at the creation of Title VII’s prohibition.
While some would disagree, I would argue that the use of the
terms “discrimination” and “because of [a protected status]” to de-
scribe what conduct is prohibited has had the opposite effect of the
effect that was predicted in the minority report; that, in fact, it has
resulted in a very narrow prohibition on employer conduct. A number
of different disciplines have contributed explanations for why statu-
tory language that lacks broad consensus might not be optimally effec-
tive for social transformation. For example, chaos theory—or more
precisely, its offshoot, the theory of complex adaptive systems—has
been suggested as a metaphor for the way that law and society inter-
act, and it suggests that laws will often produce unexpected results.168
Even if the system of law is not itself a complex adaptive system, the
concept nonetheless carries, at least as a metaphor, significant force.
Law as a practice is a sufficiently complex operation to make this
comparison attractive. We lawyers like to think that most statutes are
clearly written and uniformly applied, but the method of a law’s crea-
tion, the number of interpreters of law, broad wording of laws, and the
process of interpretation make uniformity of meaning not only un-
likely, but practically impossible.169
Philosophy, particularly the work of Foucault, has contributed to
the discourse on this subject as well. Foucault wrote extensively about
the way that knowledge, or claims to truth, is organized by disciplines
and institutions that shape the way that people think and perpetuate
themselves by doing so, in a recursive fashion.170 Cognitive psycho-
logical research supports Foucault’s description of the perpetuation of
knowledge; our perception is framed in fundamental ways by our be-
167. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2002) (describing the process of ossification of labor law).
168. See, e.g., Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science,
Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933 (1994); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity
Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-up Call
for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849
(1996). Some argue that the law is a complex adaptive system, while others say that
the science simply proves a useful metaphor. I am not making a claim one way or the
other, since this article aims not to predict how the law will behave, but instead to
describe why it behaves the way that it does.
169. See generally Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989)
(arguing that although indeterminacy of law exists, it is moderate and does not under-
mine law’s legitimacy).
170. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Rupert Swyer
trans., Random House 1982) (1972); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN
ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Vintage Books 1994) (1971).
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liefs and our experiences, and that framing reinforces our beliefs in a
recursive fashion.
According to this research, the process is a natural one. The
things in our world are infinitely varied, and if we had to fully process
the impact of each variation we encountered, we would be incapable
of acting.171 Thus, in order to function, we generalize about things—
objects and people alike—based on a few encounters with them, use
those generalizations to define categories, and in the future, quickly
sort what we encounter into those categories without reflection.172 We
use the definitions of our categories to define the thing we have en-
countered and to predict how that thing is likely to act or be acted
upon.173 This sorting function facilitates quick judgments, makes the
world seem more predictable, and allows us to act.
Although this process is important to our ability to function, rely-
ing on categories, which involves essentially creating group identities,
has far-reaching consequences. When we have assigned an object to a
group, we perceive it as more like other things within that group and
less like things outside of that group.174 This process gets personalized
when people are given group identities. Even when the distinction is
arbitrary, as with people randomly assigned to teams, people view
members of their own group (the in-group) as more like themselves,
and others (the out-group) as more different from them than if the
171. See Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1–2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977) (“Since no organism can cope with infi-
nite diversity, one of the most basic functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the
environment into classifications by which nonidentical stimuli can be treated as
equivalent.”).
172. Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZA-
TION 27, 28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978).
173. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1188–89 (1995).
174. See Donald T. Campbell, Enhancement of Contrast as Composite Habit, 53 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 355 (1956) (finding that when nonsense syllables
were linked to a spot on a spatial continuum, participants tended to judge nonsense
syllables linked to another spot as more different than no syllables were linked to any
spot); Krieger, supra note 173, at 1186 (describing two studies and citing Henri Tajfel R
& A.L. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative Judgment, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101,
104 (1963) (when lines were grouped, participants judged the comparative length of
those lines as more similar when they compared lines within the same group and more
different from each other when they compared a line to one in the other group than the
same people did when they compared the length of lines not assigned to any group);
Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 83–86 (1969)
(describing the above experiment in more detail).
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others had no group identity.175 We don’t only assign others to
groups; we identify ourselves to groups as well, and that process has
similarly important consequences. People who identify as part of a
group are also far less able to see differences among members of the
out-group even when those people are given information about the
individuals in the out-group identical to what they are given about
individuals in the in-group.176
Groups or categories are created by the “salience” of characteris-
tics.177 Once a characteristic, such as gender or race, becomes salient
to a person (matters or makes a difference), that characteristic defines
a group. But what becomes salient is neither inevitable nor natural.
Individuals define what is salient in any given context, often choosing
what their culture defines as salient.178 Because choices about salience
are within our control, we can control how our brains categorize peo-
ple into groups.179 Thus, to some extent, truly moving towards equal-
175. Marilyn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup Dis-
crimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS
58, 61 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tennbrunsel eds., 1996); Ann Locksley et al.,
Social Categorization and Discriminatory Behavior: Extinguishing the Minimal Inter-
group Discrimination Effect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773, 776–83
(1980); David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group: Categorization and Inter-
group Relations, in STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 213, 217 (David L.
Hamilton ed., 1981).
176. David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Over-
view of the Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM 127,
131 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). Numerous studies that sup-
port this assertion are summarized in Patricia W. Linville et al., Stereotyping and
Perceived Distributions of Social Characteristics: An Application to In-
group–Outgroup Perception, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION & RACISM, supra at 165,
168–73. Some of these studies involved asking members of student groups to rate the
similarity of members of their own and other groups and to assess the traits of mem-
bers of their own and different groups asking people to assess how likely someone in
their group would fit a stereotype and how likely someone outside of their group
would, and asking people with a particular opinion to rate the similarity of people
with the same or a different opinion. Id.
177. See Krieger, supra note 173, at 1190 (describing how categorical structures are R
triggered).
178. That is not to say that in every instance individuals make a conscious choice
about which characteristics matter. Conscious adoption is possible, but individuals
also absorb information about what characteristics matter to others (and therefore
should to them) from exposure to the culture they live in. See H.J. EHRLICH, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973) (“Stereotypes about ethnic groups ap-
pear as a part of the social heritage of society. They are transmitted across generations
as a component of the accumulated knowledge of society.”); Richard Nisbett, Culture
and Systems of Thought, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291, 291–92 (2001) (describing their
review of the literature on how societies differ in systems of thought and drawing
conclusions about how those differences influence cognitive processes).
179. Even though some categories become salient because we absorb them, as ex-
plained, supra note 177, the lack of fully self-aware adoption does not mean that R
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ity requires a critical mass of us to at least understand our categories
and examine our actions to see whether they could be causing harm.
One consequence of these cognitive structures is the tendency to
stereotype, or essentially create, a cognitive shortcut that links per-
sonal traits with salient characteristics in order to simplify the task of
perceiving, processing, and retaining information about people.180
Once set, these cognitive shortcuts “bias[ ] in predictable ways the
perception, interpretation, encoding, retention, and recall of informa-
tion about other people,” and they influence judgment
continuously.181
These cognitive shortcuts create expectations that transform the
way we perceive others, remember things about others, and interpret
motivations for the actions of others.182 We tend to remember the
things a person actually did only if those actions fit our stereotypes of
that person; we tend to believe we remember a person doing things
consistent with the stereotypes even if the person never did them; and,
we tend to forget the things that did not conform to those stereo-
types.183 Additionally, we tend to assume that a person who acts con-
sistently with a stereotype acted because of innate characteristics (that
salience and categorizations are outside of our control. They do not function entirely
automatically and can be confronted and changed by conscious effort. Irene V. Blair,
The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 244–47, 255–56 (2002); Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva la ´Evolucion!:
Recognizing Unconscious Motivation in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415,
430–32 (2000); see also JACK MEZIROW, TRANSFORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF ADULT
LEARNING (1991); Jack Mezirow, Transformation Theory of Adult Learning, in IN
DEFENSE OF THE LIFEWORLD 39 (M.R. Welton ed., 1995). Therefore, even though
some discrimination may happen without full, contemporaneous self-awareness, it is
still an appropriate subject of regulation by the government. See Marc Poirier, Is Cog-
nitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
459 (analogizing liability for discrimination caused by cognitive bias to the law re-
lated to dangerous conditions on land); Michael Selmi, Discrimination as Accident:
Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1234 (1999). But see Amy Wax, Discrimi-
nation as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1130–34 (1999) (arguing that there should be
no remedy for the kind of discrimination that is caused by implicit bias).
180. Krieger, supra note 173, at 1187–88; Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes R
of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321–22 (2000). While this
description of stereotypes may sound very benign, in a society with power imbalances
such as ours, stereotypes may perpetuate and even aggravate those power imbalances.
181. Krieger, supra note 173, at 1188. Just as for salience, which defines groupness R
in the first place, we decide what behaviors to attribute to particular groups either
consciously or through exposure to culture. David L. Hamilton, A Cognitive-Attribu-
tional Analysis of Stereotyping, in 12 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 53, 64 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1979).
182. See Krieger, supra note 173, at 1200–09. R
183. Id. at 1207–09 (summarizing research on stereotypes and memory); see also
Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Traits as Prototypes: Effects on Recognition Mem-
ory, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 41–45 (1978).
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they will usually act this way because they are this type of person), but
a person who acts inconsistently with a stereotype acted because of
transitional or situational factors (that they do not usually act this way
because they are not this type of person).184 For example, if we be-
lieve that women are hypersensitive to issues of gender, then we are
likely to believe that a particular woman’s complaint about sex dis-
crimination is motivated by her hypersensitivity, regardless of whether
it was or whether this particular woman is at all sensitive to such is-
sues. Thus, not only does discrimination occur through an ongoing
process of interaction that often happens outside of our normal self-
awareness, but the judgments we make about situations to which we
are external observers are colored in the same way through the same
process. Consequently, those who interpret and enforce the law are
prone to the same kinds of biases about people and situations that we
all are. To the extent that those who interpret and enforce the law tend
to belong to majority groups and to the extent that some stereotypes of
women and people of color are pervasive in our culture, they will tend
to interpret the claims of women and people of color as not constitut-
ing any sort of discrimination.
Therefore, prohibiting “discrimination” “because of” a protected
class or group status, as Title VII states, is inherently problematic. The
language used in the statute is indeterminate and overly broad; thus, it
is susceptible to the sorting functions and stereotyping problems de-
scribed above. Decisionmakers bring into the decision-making process
their own worldviews about what discrimination is, what people who
claim they have been discriminated against are like, and what mem-
bers of particular races, sexes, religions, and national origins are like.
These worldviews influence the way that decisionmakers interact with
people and how they view the interactions of others.
It is easy to understand why a Congress that sought to transform
society may have chosen to use broad language to combat discrimina-
tion and to single out only some statuses for protection. Providing le-
gal protection on the basis of group identities that have been salient in
our society for some time reflects the very real discrimination exper-
184. Krieger, supra note 173, at 1204–07. A good example of such attribution bias is R
given by Joan Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science
to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 433–34 (2003). Because women with children are
presumed to innately put their children, rather than their jobs, as their first priority,
when a woman with children is late to work, her boss is likely to assume that her
innate characteristic of prioritizing childcare responsibilities was the cause. Because
men are presumed to put work first, a man late for work may be assumed to have been
caught in traffic, a transitional cause.
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ienced by members of non-majority groups. However, Title VII de-
fines groups by their generic labels rather than by their non-majority
status or history of discrimination. In other words, protected classes
are comprised as people with a race or a sex, not as African Ameri-
cans or women. This structure has the potential to allow for evolution
as societal conditions change or our understanding of discrimination
on any of these bases changes, but it also has the potential to protect
the dominant race and sex (or religion or national origin) from
changes in the status quo. Additionally, defining legal protection by
group status means that those who enforce the statute, when consider-
ing matters related to people outside their own group, may not be able
to perceive that a person’s experience was truly negative enough to
count as discrimination or that what happened was caused by the per-
son’s membership in the group.
Giving life to the prohibition through a statute only adds to this
indeterminacy. This type of indeterminacy is a result of several fac-
tors. First, statutes are a product of collective action; a large number of
people work together to form the text (or at least to agree on the text)
that comprises the statute. Each of those people knows the meaning of
what he or she intends the text to mean, but those meanings can differ
from person to person.185 Divining what the end product means is not
simply a search for truth, but a process of creating a fictional unitary
meaning from a myriad of potential meanings, and a person’s belief
system will inform that process of creation.
“Meaning” here refers not just to meaning in a narrow sense—
that is, encompassing what the particular words mean—but also in an
operational sense, to encompass what effect the words should have on
the world. For example, most people might agree that “discrimination”
means making any kind of distinction or differentiation, but some may
185. The elusive nature of statutory interpretation and how courts should engage in it
has been debated by many. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 251–54 (1992)
(describing the views of Judge Posner and Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit,
and Justice Scalia, the three most prominent voices in the current statutory interpreta-
tion debate). For more on the debate between Judge Posner, on the one hand, and
Judge Easterbrook and Justice Scalia on the other, compare United States v. Marshall,
908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J.) with id. at 1331–38 (Posner,
J., dissenting). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 275
(1990) (discussing whether an objective method of statutory interpretation is possi-
ble); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23–29 (1997); Frank H. Eas-
terbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (rejecting the notion that
legislative bodies can have “intents”). For an alternate view of statutory interpretation,
see, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
38–47 (1994), describing and criticizing overreliance on the text to the exclusion of
other interpretive tools.
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argue that “discrimination” as used in Title VII requires animus
against a person’s protected status, and therefore that sex discrimina-
tion requires animus against women.
The phrase “because of,” when linked to the protected classes,
also suffers from an indeterminacy problem. Proving causation can be
a complicated issue both conceptually and factually. Conceptually, it
is not clear what it means for a label or identity of a person to cause an
action to be taken against that person. Some may argue that if a nega-
tive effect experienced by a person is correlated strongly with mem-
bership in that person’s group then that alone should constitute
sufficient reason to conclude that something about membership in that
group is causing the negative effect.186 Others may disagree that such
correlation is enough of a link to suggest causation.187 Additionally, it
may not even be entirely clear just how one person’s status causes
another person to take some action, and even if there is agreement that
“motive” describes how status can cause action, there will likely be
substantial disagreement on what role exactly that motive must take.
Any kind of contribution may be sufficient;188 simple but-for causa-
tion,189 proximate cause,190 or a single or predominant cause might be
required.191
186. This is essentially the kind of causation that the disparate impact theory of dis-
crimination allows for. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (allowing
a claim under Title VII when requirements for a job fall more harshly on one group
than another unless those requirements are closely linked to a minimum ability to do
the job).
187. See Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding
that a decisionmaker must act because of a protected class, not in spite of it). This
disagreement could be attributed to the distinction between the disparate impact and
disparate treatment theories of discrimination, but the disparate impact theory of dis-
crimination appears to be in some danger of being rejected or undermined by the
Supreme Court. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009) (describing
disparate impact as tangential to Title VII); id. at 2681–83 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(questioning Congress’ power to prohibit disparate impact discrimination by private
employers).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2k (2006) (providing for liability, although not damages, if a
plaintiff demonstrates that protected status was a motivating factor in the decision).
189. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240, 242 (1989) (interpreting “be-
cause of” in Title VII to allow for the possibility that protected class need not be the
only motivation, but providing a defense if it is not the but-for cause of the adverse
employment action).
190. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192–94 (2011) (holding that statutory
language which prohibits actions on the basis of military servicemember status and
further describes causation in terms of motivating factor encompassed a notion of
proximate cause that allowed any contributing cause that was close enough to the
effect to count).
191. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350–51 (2009) (holding that “be-
cause of” in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act meant that plaintiffs had to
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The room for disagreement is exacerbated by the listing of sta-
tuses in Title VII as if they were truly separate categories capable of
scientific identification and separation. Not only is it surprisingly dif-
ficult to identify what “sex” means, but when we focus on only one
aspect of a person’s multiple identities, we tend to obscure how those
multiple identities acting together may have led to what happened to
that person. There are debates about whether “sex” encompasses only
the biological differences that are true for all or nearly all women, or
also differences in behavior that are believed to be linked to sex.192
The debate over balancing work and family is a great example of this.
While women are overwhelmingly more likely than men to be respon-
sible within the family for caregiving even when they are also wage
earners outside the home, penalizing employees because they provide
care is not considered sex discrimination.193 Another classic example
is present in grooming codes that regulate behavior along gender lines:
having sex-specific rules for appearance is generally not considered to
be discrimination even when employers classify men and women and
prescribe different rules for each.194 Finally, there are also debates
about whether sexual identity or sexual orientation is a part of what
sex is or whether they are something separable from sex.195
Moreover, just as motives that mix protected status and non-pro-
tected status reasons may create problems with proving causation, so
do motives that focus on one subgroup of a protected status. If only
one subgroup is affected, there may be no discrimination against the
member of the subgroup on the basis of the larger status. Pregnancy is
a classic example of this because even though the class of people who
demonstrate that age was the but-for reason for the adverse employment action in
terms that made it sound as if but-for meant the predominant factual cause).
192. See, e.g., LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN (2006) (arguing that
women and men have different behavior linked to neurological differences);
CORDELIA FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER: HOW OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND NEUROSEX-
ISM CREATE DIFFERENCE (2010) (pointing out the weaknesses in research linking be-
havior to neurological differences and arguing that researchers’ biases make them
construct findings to support those differences); REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG, BRAIN
STORM: THE FLAWS IN THE SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES (2010) (same).
193. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CON-
FLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (1999); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The
Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the
Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 80–94, 106 (1989).
194. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1080, 1083 (9th Cir.
2004) (upholding a requirement that women wear “full” makeup and men not wear
any as not discriminatory even though men and women are required to do different
things).
195. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006); Schroer v.
Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008); I. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orienta-
tion) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158 (1991).
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are pregnant is entirely comprised of women, the class of people who
are not pregnant is comprised of both men and women. It was this lack
of perfect symmetry between the classes that led the Supreme Court to
hold that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex
discrimination.196
Another problem similar to the multiple motives problem occurs
because we all have multiple identities: we all have a race, a sex, a
religion (or identify as not ascribing to a religion), and a national ori-
gin. These intersecting identities, though present in every case, can
become problematic for those for whom more than one identity is ac-
tually visible, as when more than one identity is non-majority and im-
plicated in the case. For example, if a black woman is fired because of
stereotypes of black women, she may be found not to have suffered
any discrimination at all if those stereotypes differ from stereotypes of
white women or black men. In such a situation, a decisionmaker
would be likely to find that the black woman was not discriminated
against because of her race because other members of her race didn’t
suffer from application of that stereotype. That decisionmaker would
also likely find that she was not discriminated against because of her
sex because other members of her sex didn’t suffer from application of
that stereotype.197
Contributing even further indeterminacy, there will be signifi-
cantly more divergence about application; that is, in determining
whether any particular act constitutes discrimination. People may
agree that discrimination is the arbitrary, detrimental treatment of an-
other, but may disagree about whether the arbitrary treatment of a
member of a class that is usually privileged is really discrimination.198
196. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy was not discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII
even though only women were affected); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(holding that pregnancy and sex were analytically distinct under the Equal Protection
clause). Gilbert was superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See supra note 127 R
and accompanying text.
197. See Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and An-
tiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989). For more on how a focus on
women’s rights has worked primarily for upper and middle class white women, see,
for example, FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 73–94; RACE-ING JUSTICE AND ENGENDER- R
ING POWER (Toni Morrison ed. 1992); Julianne Malveaux, Comparable Worth and Its
Impact on Black Women, 14 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 47 (1985).
198. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (subjecting any
racial classification, even those that benefited traditionally excluded racial groups, to
strict scrutiny); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (holding that an
employment decision that benefited women was not discrimination within the mean-
ing of Title VII as long as it was taken pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan).
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Similar to the debates caused by the causation language in Title VII,
defining discrimination might create disagreements on whether an ef-
fect alone can constitute discrimination or whether it must always in-
volve intent. And they might disagree on whether certain
characteristics or behaviors are so linked to a protected status that dif-
ferentiating on the basis of those characteristics or behaviors consti-
tutes discrimination.199 Finally, they may disagree on whether certain
acts are bad enough to constitute discrimination.
While statutes are particularly prone to this consensus problem,
all law must be interpreted by those who enforce it, from judges, ad-
ministrators, bureaucrats, and public officials, to almost any public
employee—anyone who has some kind of power from a government
body—regardless of the law’s source. Moreover, the law is further
interpreted by those who aim to comply with it. Each of these enforc-
ers and compliers operates under his or her own set of cognitive bi-
ases. Thus, unless all of the actors have the same, or at least
fundamentally similar, belief systems, divergent interpretations and
applications of law are inevitable. The cognitive processes of people
in the aggregate will bend the law from its intended consequences if
the meaning of the language and the background worldview do not
share broad consensus. The law is subservient to the dominant culture,
and so even when law is used to transform society, it usually gets
transformed into a reinforcement of traditional values, unless society
is also being transformed from within.
The lack of consensus on what constitutes discrimination has
been demonstrated in the real world by the disconnect between what
scholars and many others believe constitutes discrimination and the
success—or lack thereof—employees have had seeking a legal rem-
edy for that conduct. Several scholars have documented the hurdles
that employees face in employment discrimination litigation, the pri-
mary means of enforcing our employment discrimination laws. Schol-
ars have documented how few cases are brought,200 how few cases go
199. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541,
2559–65 (1994) (noting that regulation of appearance traits has generally been found
to be discrimination based upon the trait, rather than the sex that closely correlates
with that trait and thus not a violation of Title VII); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another
Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1080
(2010) (discussing the link between hairstyles and race).
200. KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
VICTIMS 26–30 (1992) (reporting on a 1980 study by the Civil Litigation Research
Project).
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to trial,201 how few cases are resolved in favor of employees,202 and
how little private class action lawsuits seem to affect company prac-
tices.203 In other words, litigation seldom provides a mechanism for
systemic reform or a meaningful remedy for individuals.204
Part of the reason for these results is the implicit biases of the
decisionmakers that I have described. Also, we don’t just have im-
plicit biases for racial, ethnic, and sex groups; we also have implicit
biases about people who claim they have been discriminated against.
For example, individuals often predict that if they were to experience
discrimination in the workplace, they would confront the discriminator
or report the matter to a supervisor, but when these individuals are
actually faced with discrimination, most do not do those things.205
Nonetheless, people may hold others to this higher standard, and be-
come suspicious when only one employee complains.206 Additionally,
those who complain that they have been discriminated against are
often negatively perceived by others, even those who know that the
201. E.g., Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environ-
ment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 120 n.330 (1999) (suggesting that only ten
percent of employment discrimination cases go to trial); Kevin M. Clermont & Stew-
art J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 440–41, 444 (2004) (suggesting that seventy percent of
employment discrimination cases settle and plaintiffs win just over four percent of
pretrial adjudications).
202. Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 556–58, 566 (2003)
(finding that cases decided in favor of plaintiffs are four times more likely to be
reversed than those found in favor of defendants); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional
Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 283–84,
309 (1997) (arguing that meritorious cases are lost or reversed on appeal); Michael
Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV.
555, 558, 560–61 (2001) [hereinafter Selmi, Hard to Win] (asserting that employers
prevail in ninety-eight percent of federal court employment discrimination cases re-
solved at the pretrial stage).
203. Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Em-
ployment Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003) (documenting how
class actions fail to affect shareholder price or real management change in most
cases).
204. Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization?
Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 175, 184–88, 194–96 (2010) (studying employment
discrimination cases filed between 1988 and 2003, the authors studied the resolution
of those cases, accounting for the stage of litigation at which they were resolved in
addition to the substantive outcome).
205. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on Per-
ceiving and Reporting Discrimination, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 801, 824 (2006)
(having participants predict how they would act if discriminated against, exposing
them to discrimination in a laboratory setting, and giving them the opportunity to
report).
206. Id.; see also Selmi, Hard to Win, supra note 202, at 556–57, 561–71.
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complaint is valid; that is, even when a person who hears about a
complaint of discrimination knows that the person actually was dis-
criminated against.207 These cognitive biases infect enforcers’ judg-
ments about which practices constitute discrimination because of a
protected class within the meaning of Title VII.
To further complicate matters, consider the broader context of
employment issues and the prevailing worldview about the place of
law in the economy. The employment discrimination laws are rights-
based tools created to promote economic equality.208 These laws serve
to provide the public goods of justice and greater equality, ensuring
that access to employment is distributed justly.209 Economic mobility
is important for social and political stability, as well as a feeling of
economic security in the United States, and a permanent underclass, or
one group of people permanently dependent on another, threatens that
stability. The greater the economic stratification along sex lines, the
more visible the permanence of the underclass or dependent class will
be, and the greater the likelihood that the group will be more cohesive,
which could mean that its members would be more likely to organize
and rise up.210
207. Kaiser & Major, supra note 205, at 818–19 (describing an experiment where
participants were asked to evaluate characteristics of a subject who complained of
discrimination after the participants were told that the subject had been discriminated
against).
208. See, e.g., ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON H.R. 7152 OF HON. WILLIAM M. MCCUL-
LOGH, HON. JOHN V. LINDSAY, HON. WILLIAM T. CAHILL, HON. GARNER E. SHRIVER,
HON. CLARK MACGREGOR, HON. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, HON. JAMES E.
BROMWELL, H.R. Rep. 914, pt. 2, reprinted in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, supra note 159, at 2147–51. As these representatives wrote, “[t]he right to R
vote . . . does not have much meaning on an empty stomach.” Additionally:
The effect of this severe inequality in employment is felt both on the
personal level and on the national level. On the personal level an entire
segment of our society is forced into a condition of marginal exis-
tence. . . . A nation need not and should not be converted into a welfare
state to reduce poverty, lessen crime, cut down unemployment, or over-
come shortages in skilled occupational categories. All that is needed is
the institution of proper training programs and the elimination of discrim-
ination in employment practices.
Id. at 2149.
209. See HOFF, supra note 14, at 319 (labeling Title VII as embodying “significant R
redistributive public policy”); Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Ad-
ministrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405 (2006) (arguing that antidiscrimination
law is a mechanism of distributive and not just corrective justice).
210. These factors all helped explain the largest slave rebellion in U.S. history, for
example, DANIEL RASMUSSEN, AMERICAN UPRISING: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
AMERICA’S LARGEST SLAVE REVOLT (2011), and the uprisings in the spring of 2011
across the Middle East and North Africa, Liz Alderman, Wealthy Nations Move to
Bolster Arab Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2011, at A1.
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But because the employment discrimination laws are external
limitations on what is perceived to be primarily an economic relation-
ship between private parties,211 their enforcement is guided by princi-
ples in serious tension with one another. This tension allows cognitive
shortcuts greater power over people’s conduct and permits actors in
the enforcement system to privilege the principles they consider to be
on more solid consensual ground, like the consensus that government
should not interfere with economics or with private relationships. Eco-
nomic relationships are private and governed primarily by the market,
which means that these relationships are left to private ordering. The
link between economics, privacy, and a preference for private ordering
are such core American values that they need not be spoken of in
many situations. Yet the employment discrimination laws operate as
external limitations on how those economic and private relationships
can be structured. These external limitations are thus always in tension
with the economic principle of laissez-faire and the privacy principle,
or the extent to which we privilege privacy. This tension grows the
more that a person views the economic relationship as essentially eco-
nomic and private as well as when there is less consensus on the sub-
stance of discrimination or the legitimacy of its regulation. The desire
for a laissez-faire economy is in direct conflict with governmental reg-
ulation, which results in an even more limiting interpretation of anti-
discrimination legislation.
211. Employment statutes and cases ground regulation of employers in notions of
property in capital investment. They presume that employers retain the discretion to
manage their businesses and at least part of their business is in deciding whom to hire,
what to have employees do, how much to pay them, how to treat them, and how,
when, and why to discharge them. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract
at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 953–58 (1984) (grounding the practical and theoreti-
cal principles underlying the at-will presumption in employment relationships in a
combination of contract and property principles, both of which are most often eco-
nomic subjects). This economic grounding is evident in the language of labor cases
especially. For example, “[The employee] surrenders his labor as a whole, and in
return receives a compensation package . . . . Looking at the economic realities, it
seems clear that an employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood, not
making an investment.”
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979) (considering whether
a union trustee for a pension plan could be liable for securities fraud). “The right of a
person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same
as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will
accept such labor from the person offering to sell it.” Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161, 174 (1908). In employment discrimination cases, the economic justification is
conveyed by the common exhortation that courts do not sit as super-personnel boards,
second-guessing the employer’s business decisions. See Charles A. Sullivan, Circling
Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in
Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1031, 1115–16 & 1116 n.337 (2004) (docu-
menting the hundreds of cases that recite this general principle).
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The imposition of substantive rules that frustrate the operation of
the market or invade the autonomy of the parties can create significant
doctrinal and practical tension. In theory, if the employment relation-
ship is merely an economic one, the market should be able to regulate
all aspects of employment, and the efficient outcome will be the just
outcome.212 Limitations are not only unnecessary, but are also unjust.
In privacy terms, individuals should be allowed to structure the rela-
tionships that best work for them in order to maximize personal utility.
Limitations on the operation of the market or autonomy of the parties
run counter to core Western notions of liberty and autonomy.
The employment discrimination laws are not as clearly grounded
in economic principles, however. They may have an economic justifi-
cation, but that has not been the common understanding of their func-
tion.213 We do not speak of them as correcting for market failure in the
operation of the labor market, for example. Anti-discrimination laws
are instead rights-based, creating rights to equal opportunity and treat-
ment. Being rights-based rather than economically grounded, anti-dis-
crimination laws create significant tension with the economic
model,214 and the conflict is exacerbated by insufficient consensus on
the scope of the right to be free from discrimination, particularly on
the basis of sex.215
212. See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 44 (2d ed. 1971) (ar-
guing that discrimination is economically inefficient). The principles of utility and
choice have been used to find that disparities in pay and job segregation are not actu-
ally the cause of discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. E.g., EEOC v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 839 F.3d 302 (1988) (finding evidence that women were choosing
jobs that paid less). See generally FALUDI, supra note 62 (describing how anti-femi- R
nist activists and the media focused on women’s unhappiness to make the case that
women did not actually desire more equal footing with men).
213. See Jacob Gersen, Markets and Discrimination 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689,
696–714 (2007) (outlining the law and economics analyses of the extent of employ-
ment discrimination and the potential forces driving it); David L. Rose, Twenty-Five
Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Law Enforce-
ment, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1130–31 (1989) (outlining the economic arguments
advanced in favor of Title VII but noting that those who advanced that argument
concluded by saying that despite the economic justification, prohibiting discrimination
in employment was “the right thing to do” and an inalienable right).
214. See Anthony S. Chen, The Party of Lincoln and the Politics of State Fair Em-
ployment Practices Legislation in the North, 1945-64, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1713
(2007) (studying why some states adopted fair employment practice laws much more
slowly than others and concluding the slowness was a result of key GOP office hold-
ers allied with organized business and motivated by free-market, anti-regulatory
ideology).
215. See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text on the way “sex” was added to
Title VII; supra notes 166, 186–99 and accompanying text on the lack of consensus
about what sex is and what constitutes discrimination.
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I do not mean to suggest that our project of eradicating discrimi-
nation in employment is doomed to failure; on the contrary, I think we
can get there. What we need to do does not involve tinkering with the
laws, adding remedies, getting new judges, or fine-tuning the legal
tests—or at least it does not involve doing those things alone. Rather,
the path to success lies in a much broader, more amorphous project:
we need to reach a greater consensus as a nation on what “discrimina-
tion” “because of” a protected status means and why we protect cer-
tain things and not others, or we need to work to remedy the harm of
employment discrimination by bypassing the legal model of Title VII
altogether.
Any process involved in achieving a greater consensus will have
to include difficult national conversations about race, color, gender,
national origin, religion, age, and disability, all statuses that are cur-
rently protected. Part of that conversation must also concern why these
groups are protected, from whom they are protected, whether different
status groups should be treated identically, and what these statuses
mean. We also need to have difficult conversations about statuses not
yet explicitly protected as such on a federal level, but which we also
think disadvantage some, such as class, familial status, sexual orienta-
tion, and gender identity. And we need to have difficult conversations
on why some statuses are not considered important enough to protect,
why we rely on status alone instead of protecting conduct or auton-
omy, and what makes those things we don’t protect different. Beyond
that, we need to have much more public discussion of what it means to
discriminate and what conduct exactly the law should penalize.
There are a number of ways that we can begin to have these dis-
cussions as a country. The smallest step toward this goal might be to
allow litigants in individual cases to argue why the actions taken in
their cases constitute discrimination even if the employer did not make
a fully self-aware decision to treat the employee differently because of
that person’s protected status and only for that reason. A larger step
could be to engage in this conversation through Congress’s debates on
current proposed legislation, such as the legislation pending to provide
paid leave to workers,216 to provide equal pay for equivalent work,217
216. E.g., Federal Employees Paid Parental Leave Act of 2011, H.R. 616, 112th
Cong. (2011); Family and Medical Leave Enhancement Act of 2011, H.R. 1440,
112th Cong. (2011); Healthy Families Act, H.R. 1876, 112th Cong. (2011); Healthy
Families Act, S. 984, 112th Cong. (2011); Family Economic Success Act, S. 10, 112th
Cong. (2011).
217. Fair Pay Act of 2011, H.R. 1493, 112th Cong. (2011).
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to allow women into combat,218 or to add sexual orientation and iden-
tity to the classes protected.219 We might also task the Civil Rights
Commission or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with
issuing reports on the state of the nation’s workplaces, and we might
harness the power of the media to tell more stories of employees who
feel wronged. We might even create a web-based repository of stories
by employees who feel they were discriminated against, and stories by
employers about how they decide to take the actions they do.220
In a way, that is exactly what the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire
did for the broader society at the time:221 it made visible injustice in
the workplace that was hidden from public view. It made visible the
terrible working conditions that existed in garment factories. It made
visible how much power the factory owners had over employees. It
made visible how the structure of work and the lack of limitations
caused terrible injuries. It made visible the central role of women and
girls in supporting their families. It made visible the strength, capabil-
ity, intelligence, and work ethic of these women and girls in opposi-
tion to prevailing notions of the physical, mental, and emotional
inferiority of women. It made visible the class and cultural biases built
into the notion of separate spheres. And it made visible the ways in
which women as consumers were complicit in the exploitation of
women.
The increased visibility that resulted was no panacea, but without
the invisible being made visible, it would likely have taken far longer
for the safety reforms to have been enacted and at least partially en-
forced.222 Likewise, without the invisible being made visible today,
our protective legislation withers and becomes ineffectual. Like bacte-
ria and bugs that become resistant to yesterday’s cures, discrimination
becomes resistant to the rigid and narrow application of yesterday’s
laws.
218. Women’s Fair and Equal Right to Military Service Act, H.R. 1928, 112th Cong.
(2011).
219. Employment Nondiscrimination Act, H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. (2011).
220. To some extent, the large number of blogs on various aspects of human re-
sources, employment and labor law, and employment relations in general have taken
on this kind of role, but there is no comprehensive and centralized kind of repository
like that provided for incidents of street harassment, where people can submit stories
anonymously, and the stories are linked to a map of where they occurred, the details,
and pictures if the poster included those details. STOP STREET HARASSMENT, http://
www.stopstreetharassment.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
221. Each of the assertions that follows comes from the sources cited and analyzed
supra Part I.B.
222. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
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So far, we have not chosen the second path: to bypass the model
that Title VII provides us. While the states and Congress continue to
experiment with new protections for workers, particularly women
workers, that experimentation is limited to variations on a single
model that focuses on litigation as the primary means of enforcement
and prohibits actions which are defined so broadly as to have little
meaning, either extending that model to new workplaces or to new
identity groups.
One recent experiment is New York’s extension of wage and
hour protections and protections against sexual harassment to domes-
tic workers.223 The Domestic Workers Bill of Rights is the first of its
kind in the country to protect workers in private households—and
these workers need protection.
The Domestic Workers Bill of Rights does not protect workers
on the basis of their race, national origin, or sex, but it essentially
functions as protective legislation on those grounds because of the un-
derlying demographics of domestic workers in New York. With this
population, there are many parallels to the workers at the Triangle
Shirtwaist Factory at the time of the fire. Most domestic workers in
New York are women and immigrants from the Caribbean, Asia, Latin
America, and Africa: ninety-three percent of domestic workers in New
York are women, and ninety-five percent are people of color.224 Over
a quarter make less than minimum wage and live below the poverty
line, one-third say they have been abused at work, two-thirds say they
receive overtime pay rarely or never, and a mere ten percent have
access to health insurance coverage.225
While this extension of rights is an important victory for some of
New York’s most vulnerable workers, it may prove an illusory one.
Enforcement relies upon giving aggrieved workers a private cause of
action for violations of their rights,226 likely because policing domes-
tic workers’ workplaces—private homes—would be particularly chal-
lenging. This enforcement mechanism is the same as that of the more
established anti-discrimination laws, and because of the danger of re-
taliation and the tendency of courts to avoid interfering with economic
relationships, it is one of the reasons that they are not fully enforced.
Moreover, many domestic workers are employed “under the table,”
223. N.Y. Assembly Bill 1470-B, 2009–2010 Legislative Session (2010).
224. Albor Ruiz, Domestic Workers Bill of Rights Law Finally Grants Protection for
Over 200,000 People, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 2, 2010, at 50.
225. Id.
226. See N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §§ 296-B, 297 (McKinney Supp. 2011); N.Y. LAB.
LAW §§ 170, 161, 651, 663 (McKinney Supp. 2011).
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their income not reported, and at least some are not legally eligible to
work in the United States.227 These workers are highly unlikely to
seek the protection of the law and are especially exploitable. Without
visibility of what is really happening inside these workplaces, which
are largely invisible because they are private homes, it is all too easy
for employers of domestic workers to violate the law and difficult for
the law to be enforced. This statute’s protections will likely wither
from lack of use.
CONCLUSION
A century after the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire, women
workers as a group are better off. Our workplaces are mostly safer,
and the laws on the books have helped many of us attain equal access
to jobs and a right to equal pay for equal work. Nonetheless, signifi-
cant gaps remain, sometimes at levels similar to those a century ago,
and women as a group are not doing as well as men as a group on
almost any measure of achievement, status, or well-being.228 Moreo-
227. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF LABOR, FEASIBILITY OF DOMESTIC WORKER COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 7–9 (2010), available at http://www.labor.ny.gov/sites/legal/laws/
pdf_word_docs/domestic-workers/domestic-workers-feasibility-study.pdf (describing
off-the-books or under-the-table arrangements in New York and reporting that at least
thirty-four percent of employers surveyed believed their domestic workers were un-
documented, and seventy-six percent of domestic workers surveyed said they were not
U.S. citizens, although the workers did not report whether they were legally able to
work); see also Doreen J. Mattingly, The Home and the World: Domestic Service and
International Networks of Caring Labor, 91 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 370,
370–71 (2001) (examining the structure of paid household work in San Diego); Peg-
gie R. Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and
Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 45, 52–54, 57–58 (2000)
(describing paid household work); Diana Vellos, Immigrant Latina Workers and Sex-
ual Harassment, 5 AM. UNIV. J. GENDER & L. 407, 409, 412, 418–20 (1997) (describ-
ing the sexual and economic exploitation of undocumented domestic workers).
228. Scholars have noted the lack of racial and gender equality in the work force
under almost any measure: employment rates, wages, job integration, and labor force
participation. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of An-
tidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 & nn.3, 5–6 (2006); R. Richard Banks et
al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV.
1169, 1169–90 (2006); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Toward a New Civil Rights Framework,
30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 353, 353–57 (2007); Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened
to Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 899, 900 (2005). For data, see COUNCIL OF ECON.
ADVISORS, CHANGING AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (1998), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/
ca/pdfs/ca.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET & ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, WOMEN IN AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
WELL-BEING (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
rss_viewer/Women_in_America.pdf; see also Jessica Martin, Widening Racial Gap
Exists in Key Factors for Economic Well-Being According to New Study, WASHING-
TON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS (July 15, 2009), http://news.wustl.edu/news/Pages/
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ver, even with all of the laws we have a century after the Triangle
Shirtwaist Factory fire, a lack of enforcement problem similar to that
faced by the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory workers remains present.
The last century saw us move from protecting women as workers
in a world where workers were supposed to be men, to protecting
women as women (at least as long as they were similar enough to
men). We have been deeply conflicted on how best to approach the
problems of inequality, and yet, we mostly just tinkered in the mar-
gins, making slight variations on approaches not designed to change
the status quo very much. Since we ignored the underlying realities of
our segregated workforce and the structural and societal inequalities
that shaped it, the status quo of those underlying realities and struc-
tural inequality remained largely intact. The next century challenges
us to merge the interests of more women and more workers into our
solutions, to address the interests of women who historically have
been left behind in a more nuanced and substantive way.
14334.aspx (reporting on a study not yet published by Mark R. Rank, professor of
social welfare at Washington University).
